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I. INTRODUCTION.
Does culture shape law or does law shape culture?  Throughout history, culture 
has taken the leading role by informing society of what laws are necessary and 
appropriate.1 Today, however, global economics are rapidly changing the world, and 
credit  - particularly consumer credit - is being offer in greater amounts and to greater 
numbers of people in more countries than ever before.2  Commercial borrowing is also on 
the rise. One question raised by these increases in debt is whether there will be sufficient 
safety nets in place to help people and entities that are unable to pay back all this new 
debt.
Many governments with developing economies are aware of the need for more 
forgiving insolvency systems, and are implementing such systems.3 In most cases, 
however, these new proposed systems do not arise from existing cultural conditions.  
Rather, the laws are transplanted from elsewhere and the cultural views are expected to 
change with the laws. Many new bankruptcy laws have been transplanted from the U.S., 
which has a very different cultural attitude toward debt forgiveness.4 Although these 
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 Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, The Culture of Deindividualization, The Paradox of 
Blackness, 70 IND. L. J. 709, 713-14 (1995) (discussing generally how culture informs law and economics 
and vice versa); Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN 35, 37 (2001) (describing law as 
culture). 
2 See Growth of Credit Cards in Emerging Markets Leading to Concern Over Mounting Consumer Debt 
and Card Fraud, M2 Presswire, October 15, 2002, 2002 WL 26804947 (describing skyrocketing credit 
card debts in China, South Korea, Brazil,and Thailand);  Paul Mizen, (paper published by the Experian 
Certre for Economic Modeling, School of Economics, University of Nottingham), at 1, 
http:/nottingham.ac.uk/eco, visited on March 3, 2003. European Credit Research Institute, ECRI Research 
Report Number 1, Consumer Credit in the European Union, at 16-18, hppt://www.ecri.be/pubs/ecrien, 
visited on March 2, 2003 (noting tremendous increases in credit card debt in Europe);  Ian Fletcher, Card 
Fraud Soars to Pounds 228M, EVENING STANDARD, Oct. 16, 2002, 2002 WL 101323704 (noting mounting 
credit card debt throughout the United Kingdom, Mexico and Malaysia, as well as China, South Korea and 
Thailand); Jason Booth, KIS Investors Bet on South Korea’s Rising Debt, WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 30, 
2002, 2002 WL 3396232 (dicussing the U.S.and South Korean levels of credit card debt and predicting a 
consumer-credit blowout in South Korea that could slow the entire economy). 
3 See Rafeal Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 81, 92-93(2002).
4 See Julia M. Metzger & Samuel L. Bufford, Exporting United States Bankruptcy Law: The Hungarian 
Experience, 21 CAL. BANKR. J.153, 153 (1993) (noting how other countries are looking to the U.S. for an 
example of a working bankruptcy system). Article 9 of the U.C.C. is also being examined by other 
countries. See Daniel E. Allen, Personal Property Security Interests in Australia, A Long, Long Trail A-
Winding, 106 DICK. L.REV. 145, 147 (2991) (discussing how New Zealand, Canada, Australia and even 
2imported systems have been strangely out of place in other societies, the transplantation 
continues.5  This Article raises the question of whether these attempts at transplantation 
are likely to create the desired results of fueling a market economy and promoting 
economic growth and well-being. 
The current American bankruptcy system grew directly out of the U.S.’s unique 
capitalist system, 6 which rewards entrepreneurialism as well as extensive consumer 
spending.7  It makes sense that a society in which dollars rule would have a forgiving 
personal bankruptcy system in order to keep consumer spending high,8 and an equally 
forgiving business reorganization system to encourage risk taking and economic growth.9
Both systems are part of a larger scheme to keep economic players alive and active in the 
game of capitalism.  American bankruptcy systems are among the country’s few social 
programs and address many of society’s ills.10 Thus, they are broad and form an integral 
part of the social system from which they sprung.11
As globalization takes place, more and more countries believe that creating a 
viable bankruptcy system will help fuel a market economy.12  As a result, many countries 
have attempted to create a Chapter 11-style reorganization scheme for failing enterprises, 
in which existing management stays in place and manages the reorganizing company.13
England, are looking to Article 9 of the American Uniform Commercial Code to solve a few nagging 
problems with personal property security systems in their own countries’ laws).
5 See infra notes 409-37 and 482-511and accompanying text.
6
 As one American scholar recently noted:
[E]ach country gets the bankruptcy law it deserves.  I think we deserve chapter 11.  Bankruptcy 
does not exist independent of the social system that exists in each nation.  The United States has 
little in the way of government sponsored programs to compensate people for the dislocation 
caused by financial failure.  So every financial problem, and that is not hyperbole, I think that’s 
almost true, every consequence of every financial problem is thrown into our bankruptcy system: 
environmental problems, mass tort problems, business failure problems, failure of companies 
properly to fund their retirement plans.  Whatever the reason for financial failure, the only place 
we have to put it is bankruptcy.
Richard F. Broude, et.al., The Judge’s Role in Insolvency Proceedings:  Views From the Bench:  Views 
from the Bar, 10 AMER. BANKR. INST. L.REV. 511, 522 (2002) (comments of Richard Broude) (hereinafter, 
“Views from the Bench”). 
7
 Spending is critical to the U.S. economy, as President Bush reminded us after 9/11.  Frequent admonitions 
to spend caused one author to call this the “shop-till Osama-drops” plan for fighting terrorism.  See Alan 
Reder, The Yoga of Money, YOGA JOURNAL, March-April 2003, at 114.
8
“When will we Spend Again?,” October 26, 2001, www.cnn.com, visited on January 7, 2003.
9 See  infra notes 157-198 and accompanying text.
10 See supra note 6; see also KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS:  REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY 
SYSTEM 93-98 (1997)(describing the incredible emotional benefits of bankruptcy, which in turn benefit the 
economy as well as the persons well being).
11
 In the United States, we do not draw large distinctions between our forgiving “rescue” culture for 
businesses on the one hand, and for individuals on the other. Philosophically, every person is a potential 
entrepreneur. See EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING FAILURE: BANKRUPTCY AND COMMERCIAL 
SOCIETY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 28 (N. Carolina Press 2001).
12
 The International Monetary Fund certainly believes this and made creation of a reorganization system for 
failing businesses a prerequisite to bail-out assistance during the Asian crisis. See Thailand Letter of Intent, 
dated August 25, 1998, http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/082598.htm, visited on March 26, 2003.
13
 The rationale is that providing for rescue opportunities creates additional benefits to society not available 
in a liquidation only system, such as greater return for unsecured creditors, an ability for equity holders to 
3These systems are perhaps the most common American legal export today.14 Many 
countries are also liberalizing their consumer bankruptcy systems.15 Because consumer 
credit has become much more available in Western Europe and Japan, as well as parts of 
the developing world, more forgiving bankruptcy systems are a necessity.16 They cannot 
be imported wholesale, however.
Insolvency systems profoundly reflect the legal, historical, political, and cultural 
context of the countries that have developed them. Thus, even countries that share a 
common legal tradition, such as the United States, England, Canada, and Australia, 
display marked differences in how they approach both business and personal 
bankruptcies.17  Countries with different legal traditions, such as those within Continental 
Europe and Japan, currently have even more divergent bankruptcy systems, though many 
are moving toward the U.S. models.18
Given the vast cultural differences around the world, and the history of each 
country’s economy and attitudes about money and debt, there is no one-kind-fits-all 
bankruptcy system for either enterprises or individuals.19  New insolvency systems must 
instead reflect how individual nations have experienced the growth of market economies, 
and how, philosophically, countries have viewed debt.  Bankruptcy systems are social 
tools.  As such, they are value-laden and must be drafted with care to reflect the particular 
values of a culture. Yet the extensive availability of credit requires a face-saving way out 
of financial failure. Providing such a way out is a challenge many nations will face as 
credit is used more extensively in the new modern economy. This Article attempts to aid 
this transition in some small way, by helping inform the decisions made within 
developing systems.
Part II of this Article explains the symbiotic relationship between capitalism and 
bankruptcy laws, the theories behind these laws, and the history and political systems
retain an interest in a viable company, saving jobs, allowing suppliers to survive and allowing customers to 
continue receiving goods and services that may be in short supply.  See Jeffrey Davis, Bankruptcy, 
Banking, Free Trade, and Canada’s Refusal to Modernize its Business Reorganization Laws, 26 TEX. L. 
REV. L. J.  253, 253 (1991).  Liquidation, conversely, can cause a domino of failure, unnecessarily harming 
everyone whom the debtor does business.  See id.
14
 Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 154.  Initiatives to replicate at least some of the properties of 
Chapter 11 can be seen in Japan, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, China, the former Soviet Union, and 
Mexico, among other places.  See id
15 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 92-93.  Some countries, such as Italy and France, still have no personal 
bankruptcy system at all. See infra notes  347-70 and accompanying text.  
16 See Rafael Efrat, The Rise and Fall of Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study of Individual Bankruptcy 
Petitioners in Israel, 7 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 163, 165-66. (discussing the need for a forgiving bankruptcy 
systems once credit has been deregulated).
17 See Nathalie Martin, Common Law Bankruptcy Systems:  Similarities and Differences, 11 AMER. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 367, 403-10 (2003).
18 See infra notes 262-302, and 375-411and accompanying text.
19
 One may not simply reproduce Chapter 11, with its emphasis on the enterprise, the shareholders and the 
creditors, in societies that place more value on employees and government debt than on payments to private 
creditors.  Nor can one expect a society that deeply values a person’s word, and his or her “honor,” to 
readily accept the personal bankruptcy discharge, even if doing so would fuel an economy based on 
consumer spending.
4upon which they are based.20 This section also describes modern credit practices and 
attitudes toward debt and repayment.21 It then briefly describes the American bankruptcy 
systems that developed out of this economic history.22
Part III discusses divergent attitudes toward debt in other parts of the world, using 
England, parts of continental Europe, and parts of East Asia as examples.23  While many 
of these countries and regions have imported U.S.-style bankruptcy laws to some extent, 
all have far less forgiving cultural views toward debt and debt forgiveness than does the 
U.S.24 Given these pronounced differences in attitude, this Section concludes that the 
mere import of U.S.-style reorganization and personal debt forgiveness systems is 
unlikely to create the desired economic effect.25
Part IV describes the global trend toward credit proliferation and concludes that 
countries must carefully examine cultural views and attitudes before allowing credit to 
spin out of control in their countries.26  If it is too late, and credit is already widely 
available despite very negative stigma toward failure, this section advocates large-scale 
education efforts in order to keep people from becoming indigenous, or even suicidal, 
following mounting debt.27   It ultimately concludes that while importing a more 
forgiving bankruptcy system may help stem these problems, without changes in cultural 
attitudes, these new laws may have little impact.28
II. BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES:  HISTORY, ATTITUDES AND LAW
This Section outlines the history of the U.S. growth economy and the unique 
entrepreneurial spirit that led to an equally unique bankruptcy system for both businesses 
and consumers.29 It also discusses the development of consumer and credit culture and 
the laws that have developed from these unique quirks of history.30
A.  The History of the American Economy:  The Connection Between Bankruptcy Law 
and Capitalism
20 See infra notes 31-198 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 118-45 and accompanying text. This section discusses recent empirical research regarding 
the types of debts that Americans have, as well as the circumstances many individual debtors face when 
they file for bankruptcy.  It briefly examines business or corporate debt culture in America as well, 
concluding that there is little stigma associated with business failure in the United States, given the 
premium Americans place on entrepreneurialism and risk taking.
22 See infra notes 146-98 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 199-510 and accompanying text.
24 See id.
25 See infra notes 507-10 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 511-20 and accompanying text.
27 See id.
28 See infra notes 517-20 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 31-65 and accompanying text. One of the goals of this section is to explain to foreign 
scholars who are studying the U.S. insolvency systems, as well as to American scholars, how the American 
system came into being and how it fuels U.S. capitalism and entrepreneurialism.
30
 See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
5Relatively speaking, American society can be characterized as capitalistic and 
consumeristic, although the extent to which America should embrace these two 
ideologues has been controversial throughout our history.31 Early discussions of 
bankruptcy policy were divisive, in part because early bankruptcy policy helped shape 
our nation’s economic identity.32  The expansion of capitalism and spending resulted in 
some failure, followed by the creation of our first bankruptcy system.33  This section 
reviews the economic culture from which this bankruptcy system arose.34
1. The Development of America’s Free-Market Economy.  
Alex de Tocqueville’s “new model man” portrayed America as a child of the 
commercial revolution that should progress quickly toward commercial and industrial 
maturity. 35 This model saw economic prosperity, technical development, education and 
expanded cultural opportunities as the lynchpins of a successful society.36 On the other 
hand, the agricultural sector of society rejected these big-business ideas as a threat to 
their ideal nation of small producers and laborers who earned an honest living working 
the soil.37  They saw the new merchant and financial capitalists as: 
parasites who drop their buckets into wells dug by others…. Unbounded by any 
connection to honest labor, their profits could accrue to such a level as to enable 
the capitalist sector to upset the delicate counterpoise of interests that sustain a 
free and virtuous social order, and substitute a morally vacuous dynamic of 
market transactions and profit calculations that respects the social identity of 
neither person nor property.38
In this context, the battle over appropriate bankruptcy laws began. The market capitalists 
saw the development of a credit-based economy as absolutely essential. Conversely, the 
31 See Richard C. Sauer, Bankruptcy Law and the Maturing American Capitalist, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 291, 
291-97 (1994). 
32 See id. at 298. 
33 See id.
34
 This Article does not outline the history of American bankruptcy laws, as this has been done well and 
extensively by previous scholars. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy 
Discharge, 65 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 325, 336 (1991)(hereinafter, “Evolution of Discharge”) ; Charles Jordan 
Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AMER. BANKR. INST. L. J. 5, 7 
(1995)(hereinafter, “History of Bankruptcy”).
35 See id. at 291-92. 
36 See id. at 292.
37 See id. These were the Jeffersonian Republicans, who later became Democratic Republicans, and then 
finally, modern-day Democrats. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION 26 (Princeton Univ. Press 
2001).
38 See id. at 293. As Sauer notes, this view was not limited to purely southern agrarians. For instance, 
Benjamin Franklin wrote, "the only honest Way; wherein Man receives a real Increase of the Seed thrown 
into the Ground, in a kind of continual Miracle wrought by the Hand of God ... as a reward for his innocent 
Life and virtuous Industry." Benjamin Franklin, Positions to Be Examined, Apr. 4, 1769, in 16 FRANKLIN 
PAPERS 107, 109 (Williams Wilcox ed., 1972). Thus, the Franklin’s sentiments illustrates that upon this 
nation’s formation, mercantile capitalism-with its venture capitalists-was not an idea embraced 
immediately. 
6agrarian sector of society saw extensive credit as a vice.39  The more a person wished to 
create a free-market capitalist economy, the more he supported the free availability of 
credit, as well as a systematic means of dealing with financial failure.40
By the early 1800’s capitalist interests began to win out over agrarian interests, 
and a greater number of agrarians began producing food for sale rather than mere 
consumption.41  Artisans in turn moved away from customized markets and toward 
standardized goods for a larger market.  More and more Americans entered business as 
merchants of one form or another.42 Burgeoning market-oriented production and surging 
demand for food and consumer goods fostered great economic growth.  In the decades 
following the War of 1812, Americans produced more cotton, grain, livestock, textile 
goods, coal, and lumber, than previously thought possible.43 A greater number of 
Americans began, at last, to have disposable income to spend on house wares, nicer 
homes, fancier furnishing and clothing and unimproved land. 
The expansion of America’s market economy, however, depended heavily upon 
“the credit system”- an intricate tangle of obligations that extended throughout the 
country’s financing production, distribution, and consumption.44 America saw itself as a 
land of great potential, and was thus taken by optimism and a willingness to build and 
spend far beyond its actual wealth.45  Thus, the antebellum economy was structured as 
much around borrowed money and promises to pay as it was around rivers, roads and 
canals.46
Few merchants could enter business without credit.47  Entrepreneurs rarely paid 
rent, wages, supplies, or transportation costs in advance, nor did they demand cash from 
their own customers.48 A study of the court records of debtors who filed for bankruptcy 
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 showed that the use of credit was common by the mid-
1800s.49 Thus, by the mid-1800s, many merchants not only paid debts many months after 
39 See id. at 294-95. These were the Federalists, who later became the Whigs, who then became modern-
day Republicans.  See Skeel, supra note 37, at 26.
40 See id. Much of this view was predicated on the intangibility of credit. That is, as a primarily agrarian 
economy, where trade and commerce existed as a real exchange of goods, credit allowed one party to the 
transaction to “cheat” by receiving something for nothing. In a sense, the idea of credit as a vice to these 
agrarians makes perfect sense as their timeframe within each commercial transaction was as limited as the 
perishability of the items they sold. Thus, selling on credit a perishable item that could never be 
repossessed likely influenced this view. 
41 See BALLEISEN, supra note 11, at 26. 
42 See id. at 26-27. 
43 See id.
44 See id. at 27.
45 Id.
46
 Id. at 27-28.
47 See id. at 26. As Balleisen notes, this dependence on credit was based in part on the development of 
America’s post-revolution brand of market capitalism. Id.
48
 See id. at 28 (describing how merchants rarely expected to be paid upon delivery, for agricultural 
products or finished articles).
49 See id. generally. Balleisen spent several years in the Northeast branch of the National Archives in 
Bayonne, and later when it relocated to Manhattan, examining federal bankruptcy records following the 
passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. Balleisen found that as many as one in three businesses succumbed 
7they were incurred, but also allowed their own customers to pay them under even slower 
payment schedules.50  Needless to say, this does not make particular business sense, but 
the free market economy was new and many wanted to participate.51
The availability of credit was seen as central to reaching economic potential in a 
capitalist system.52  In fact, one scholar had called “systemized credit” the one 
characteristic of capitalism that distinguishes it from all other economic orders.   As the 
Albany Republican Committee noted in 1837, “the credit system has extended our 
commerce all over the world - peopled our wilderness - built our cities and villages -
founded our colleges and built our schools.  It has given us national wealth and individual 
prosperity.” 53 In short, credit was in large part what defined capitalism as well as 
wealth.54
2.  The Rationale and Political Milieu of Early American Bankruptcy Law.
While credit was seen as necessary, it also had its hazards. Where there is credit, 
there is also default, and the use of credit unquestionably made early Americans 
vulnerable to the shifting currents of the overall economy, and intricately tied to the 
financial health of the firms with which they did business.55  This may explain why many 
early market capitalists in America favored a systematic and forgiving bankruptcy system 
to address the issue of default.56 Ironically, a system of distributing a debtor’s available 
assets and discharging his or her remaining debts was ultimately seen as a characteristic 
to filing for bankruptcy. He found that the availability of credit was far greater than many had anticipated. 
One of his underlying theses is that the integration of a national credit system helped contribute to a new 
phase of capitalism in America. The average American could now start up a business on credit and live the 
American dream. Of course, the business cycle, economic blights, and large debt burdens forced many to 
file.  See id. generally.
50 See id. at 28-32.
51 See id. at 53. Balleisen quotes an article from a defunct New York magazine from the time, which read 
“All classes became smitten with a sudden criminal passion of being rich…They thought no more of the 
gradual accumulation of wealth by labor, but would escape the curse imposed on Adam. A fortune must 
now be made in a day.” Rural tales and sketches of Long Island: The Kushow Property, THE 
KNICKERBOCKER (1835) 190.
52 See Sauer, supra note 31, at 294-95 (discussing how the availability of credit has long been central to 
developing a capitalist economy). See also FOREST & ELLEN SHAPIRO MCDONALD, REQUIM:  VARIATIONS 
ON EIGHTEENTH CENTURY THEMES 185 (1988); ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 275-77 (1937).
53 See BALLEISIEN, supra note 11, at 32. The quote comes from a July 22, 1837 article in NWR, Address of 
the Albany General Republican Committee” Credit is the universal solvent of a market economy.  It 
increases the liquidity of assets and allows extensive investment, even from geographically remote 
locations. 
54
 "[Credit] is a kind of mercantile funding system, which enables [merchants] to enlarge their capital by 
anticipating the profits of their enterprises." 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1098 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Wood).
55 See BALLEISEN, supra note 11, at 31. 
56 See Sauer, supra note 31, at 295-96; but see supra notes 42-45. Thus, the division between agrarians and 
capitalists, between bankruptcy advocates and those against it, was predicated on a recognition of the 
potential for failure and the need to address such failure. 
8of economic modernity, “the result of the complex development to which modern society 
has attained.”57
People took risks and the bankruptcy system facilitated this risk by design.  The 
drive to be self-employed, and thus to be successful in business, caused a great deal of 
financial failure in the mid-1800’s.58 The economy was friendly to any capitalist effort, as 
the goal was to create a vibrant market economy as quickly as possible. 59 As young men 
tried their luck at business, many learned about success, as well as failure in the pursuit.60
Interestingly, early bankruptcy merchants included women as well as men, indicating that 
women participated in the marketplace even as early as the 1700’s.61
A legal culture of tolerance toward non-payment developed, in order to encourage 
people to continue entrepreneurial pursuits.62  The relative lenience of American 
bankruptcy law, as compared to law on the European Continent, for example, shocked 
some, including Alex de Toqueville, who commented on the “strange indulgence” shown 
to bankrupts in the American Union.63  He claimed that in this respect, “the Americans 
differ, not only from the nations of Europe, but from all the commercial nations of our 
time.”64
57 Id. at 296(quoting R. McLean, Bankruptcy Law, 2 LAW NOTES 292, 292 (Albert Gibson ed., 1883); see 
also H.R. Rep. No. 5, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. (1841); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 755 (1866) 
(remarks of Rep. Jenckes). 
58 See BALLEISEN, supra note 11, at 15. The desire to go into business, despite inexperience and limited 
capital, made many early entrepreneurs vulnerable to financial failure.  See id.
59 See id.
60 See id. at 18.
61 See Karen Gross, Marie Stefanini Newman, and Denise Campbell, Ladies in Red:  Learning from 
America’s First Female Bankrupts, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 20 (1996).  The stories of the women told in 
this article prove that women of the 18th and 19th century were indeed engaged in the commercial 
marketplace and the world of debt and credit.  Some had children and some did not, and most were engaged 
in business of some sort. See id. at 16-18. Like the men, some failed, but in a sense this is evidence of their 
success. See id. at 36. They too were willing to take risks. See id.
62 See BALLEISEN, supra note 11, at 16.
63 See id. at 13.
64 Id. at 13. Tolerance toward bankruptcy debtors was seen as a significant contributor to successful 
capitalism, as volatility in the free market was a fact of life. See id. at 18; see also Sauer, supra note 31, at 
295.   As during financial panics and depressions, bankruptcy helped problems percolate slowly through the 
system.  More importantly, endemic insolvency and the ability of bankrupts to gain legal absolution from 
old debts “unleashed a range of economic energies.”  As Balleisen explains:
Perhaps the most important connections between antebellum bankruptcy and the release of 
capitalist energy manifested themselves in post-failure career strategies. Not every former 
bankrupt sought haven from risk after insolvency. Discharge from past obligations encouraged a 
number of highfliers to redouble their entrepreneurial efforts. These bankrupts typically sought to 
breech prevailing commercial boundaries, either by expanding the domain of market transactions, 
developing new products, or devising new methods of distribution. On occasion such efforts 
produced spectacular postfailure successes; more commonly they led only to new accumulations 
of unpayable obligations. Collectively, the ventures of risk-taking former bankrupts helped 
consolidated a business culture predicated on “creative destruction,” in which a multitude of 
entrepreneurs mounted ongoing assaults on prevailing forms of economic activity, at once seeking 
profits and envisioning, if not always realizing, a continuous process of social “improvement.
9The American system also developed from the U.S.’s unique partisan political 
system, the unique way that both debtor and creditor interests were balanced in the 
system, and the early and prominent role of attorneys as the primary professionals in the 
developing system. In his account of the role of politics in the developing U.S. 
bankruptcy law, bankruptcy historian David Skeel explains that once creditor groups 
formed trade organizations that promoted the passage of a federal bankruptcy law, 
populist interests joined forces as well, forcing a compromise between debtor and 
creditor groups not seen in England or elsewhere. Because Republicans tended to favor 
creditor interests and Democrats or the populists tended to favor debtor interests, the 
compromises that resulted were the product of the unique, American two-party system.
Moreover, from the start, private attorneys played a very significant role in 
American bankruptcy cases and in the reform process.  As the law took shape, general 
practitioners began to specialize in bankruptcy cases. These attorneys perpetuated the 
system.  As Professor Skeel, recounts:
…government agencies have a tendency to self-perpetuate. Once Congress 
establishes a new agency and creates jobs for a group of new government 
officials, these same officials will later serve as the primary bulwark against 
elimination of the agency. In a sense, the agency becomes its own political 
constituency.65
As Professor Skeel explains, while the bankruptcy bar is private rather than 
governmentally-run, it has played an analogous, self-perpetuating role.  This is one 
explanation for why the system changes, but never by leaps and bounds.
BALLEISEN, supra note 11, at 19. A lenience toward debtors helped ordinary people create a market 
economy in the United States, and also caused some to rethink their role in the capitalist economy and thus 
to engage in valuable “capitalist adaptation.” Id. at 21. 
Thus, bankruptcy’s historical popularity with the commercial classes is attributable to its ability to 
promote and foster commercial development in several ways.  First, having an involuntary bankruptcy 
system in place makes it more efficient to collect and distribute assets and also serves a deterrent function 
of causing people to pay debts rather than lose assets. See Sauer, supra note 31, at 299.  Both involuntary 
and voluntary bankruptcy save the costs of fighting among creditors and prevents state law collection 
efforts from eviscerating the debtor’s estate before it can be efficiently distributed. Preference laws, which 
require that creditors who received advantageous payments or property just prior to a bankruptcy to return 
it, discourage creditors from trying to gain such advantage while a debtor is insolvent. See id.  Finally, by 
allowing a debtor to discharge most debts as long as he or she is honest and cooperative, the debtor has 
every incentive to be honest and helpful and not hide assets. See id.
Other more obvious financial benefits flow from a well-developed bankruptcy system as well.  By 
limiting the financial exposure of individuals, risk-taking is encouraged and the economy can grow.  See id. 
at 301. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, by allowing an individual to discharge debts that are a burden, 
he or she can return to economic life, hire employees or be an employee, pay taxes, buy things, and 
otherwise fuel the economy.  Such a system can keep that person “in play”, rather than leaving them 
economically dormant, imprisoned, and with a family supported by the state.  
This Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the precursor to our current system and the first systematic 
bankruptcy system of the nation. Id. The history surrounding its enactment explains in some measure how 
our complex bankruptcy system developed so much earlier than all other systems of its kind around the 
world. Id.
65
 Skeel, supra note 37, at 90.
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Thus, a number of unique characteristics have created the United States’ unique 
bankruptcy system.  These characteristics include a strong societal desire to create a 
commercial economy, a resulting extensive use of credit, a desire to balance creditor and 
debtor interests in developing the law, a unique two-party political system that helped 
create this balance, as well as a highly unusual and prominent role for private attorneys in 
the bankruptcy process.
3. The Rise in American Consumerism.
The above discussion focuses primarily on the development of business and 
commerce and the resulting business debt. Our current attitudes toward “personal” or 
“consumer” bankruptcy, on the other hand, developed far more recently, under 
circumstances no less unique. The United States was pulled out of the great depression by 
World War II, which created jobs for virtually everyone who was not in the Armed 
forces.66  Due to rationing of most consumer products, and stopped production for others, 
most people saved their wages.67 After the war, we experienced a period of inflation, 
after which consumer demand for various household goods and services increased 
dramatically.68  Three things fueled these increases in demand, a pent-up desire for things 
that were unavailable during the war, large savings accounts, and the baby boom.69
American policy at the time promoted spending to the fullest extent possible.  As 
one consultant announced shortly after the war,” the greatest challenge facing American 
business was convincing consumers that the hedonistic approach to life is a moral, not an 
immoral one.”70  This strategy apparently worked well, as Americans began purchasing 
to be happy, and building social experiences around the act of acquiring.71
As inflation subsided, the housing and auto industries expanded and America 
began exporting a huge variety of goods, including farm products.  This resulted in large 
trade surpluses since Europe and Japan, our main trade partners, had little to export.72
The economy grew strongly and stably in the early 1950s.73 Capital was plentiful, and 
consumer goods appeared everywhere in record numbers.  Chains like Sears and 
Montgomery Ward sold products cheaply and more and more household electronic goods 
were being manufactured.74
66 See John Henry Schlaegel, Law and Economic Change in the Short Twentieth Century, draft manuscript, 
on file with author.
67 See id. at 3, 8. 
68 See id. at 8. 
69 See. id.
70
 David Ray Papke, Discharge as Denouement:  Appreciating the Storytelling of Appellate Opinions, in 
NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE 206, 214 (ed. Papke 1991).
71 See id.
72 See  Schlaegel, supra note 66, at 9. 
73 See id. at 9. 
74 See id. at 3-4. 
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 Americans with ready cash on hand began to believe that they needed these 
gadgets, that they were a sign of modernity and prosperity, and that buying them would 
fuel the economy.  Thus, a consumer class was born.  
Since that time, though the U.S. economy has sagged at various times, U.S. wages 
have made domestic production uncompetitive in many industries and thus upset trade 
balances.75 Wealth per household actually decreased, yet consumer spending did not 
dissipate.76  Instead, it has increased as consumer credit has been made available in 
record amounts to people of lower and lower economic means.77  Over time we have 
learned to consume too well.  While we can manufacture and produce many products and 
services worthy of export, our voracious desire to consume makes it unlikely that we will 
ever produce as much as we use.78  As a culture, we love to spend, and are even 
encouraged to do so when the economy flags, despite record household credit and record 
low savings rates.
4. The Effect of Low Down-Payment Home Loans on Consumer Spending 
Habits.
Another historical event that drastically changed the debtor-creditor system in the 
United States was the home ownership program introduced by President Roosevelt in the 
New Deal Legislation.79  Before 1930, home loans had short terms and were used 
primarily by the wealthy, because one was required to put down 50% of the purchase 
price in order to get a home loan.  As a result of these conditions, only about 45% of the 
homes in American were owner occupied.80  Roosevelt sought to foster stability and 
75
 Low-skill labor wages in the U.S. are much higher than similar skill labor wages elsewhere.  In these 
cases, firms have a clear incentive to move abroad those operations which utilize low-skill labor.  
Slaughter, Matthew J., Multinational Firms and Wages in a Global Economy, www.dartmouth.edu/`glm, 
visited on January 6, 2003.
76 Id.
77 See Credit Screening: The Rest of the Story, 49 CON L. QUARTERLY 391 (Fall 1995); see also THERESA 
SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN AND JAY WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 135 (Yale University 
Press 2000)(hereafter, “FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS”). In 1910, Sears began selling goods on credit to ordinary 
working class people.  In 1949, the Diners Club card was Fragileborn, so executives could keep track of 
charges and pay just one bill per month. See id. at 109.  In 1958, American express and Carte Blanche 
joined and in the 1960’s MasterCard and Visa set up their extensive credit card networks.  In 1986, Sears 
entered the all-purpose card market with its Discover Card. By the end of the 1990’s, Americans carried 
over $500 billion in outstanding credit card debt. See id.
The next historical event of significance was the deregulation of consumer interest rates, which 
made credit card lending the more profitable than any other aspect of lending, and also made it profitable to 
lend to higher credit risks.  See id. at 135. 
78
 Statistics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis show that over the past few years, we have consumed 
more than we have produced.  Table 1.2, Real Gross Domestic Product, www.bea.doc.gov., visited on 
January 8, 2003.
79
 U.S. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 stat. 888(current version at 42 U.S.C. section 1437(2002)). 
80 See Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 ST LOUIS L. J. 
665, 676 (2002);  Thomas W. Hanchett, The Other “Subsidized Housing”:  Federal Aid to
Suburbanization, 1940-1960’s in FROM TENAMENTS TO TAYLOR HOMES 163, 165 (John I. Bauman et.al. 
eds.. 2000)).
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security during the depression by making it much easier for the average person to buy 
and keep a home. 81
This was accomplished through the formation of the Home Owners Loan 
Corporation (HOLC), the FHA and the VA. The FHA, created by the National Housing 
Act of 1934,82 did not make mortgage loans but rather insured them.  Because the FHA 
began insuring these loans, lenders were much more willing to make loans with lower 
down payments and at lower interest rates.83  This made mortgage loans more available 
to the middle class than ever before.84  Owning a home became a nearly universal 
American dream after World War II.85  As late as 1940, half of all young adults between 
the ages of 20 and 24 lived with their parents.86  In the fifteen years following the war, 
home ownership shot up to 62%.87  No one individual was more responsible for this 
change than William Levitt, who built new cape cod homes and sold them for $7,990 in 
the late 40’s,88 with little or no money down and a 4 1/2% interest rate.89
81
 Perhaps I should say that this legislation made it easier for the average white person to buy and keep a 
home.  Numerous scholars have noted that at the same time that the FHA and VA reduced down payments 
under these programs, minorities were refused such loans and instead lived in stingy, alienating public 
housing projects, which hindered minority home ownership for the rest of this countries history.  See 
Roisman, supra note 84, at 676.
82
 Alice O’Conner, Understanding Inequality in the Late Twentieth Century Metropolis: New Perspectives 
on the Great Racial Divide, IN URBAN INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES 22 (Alice O’Connor, 
et.al.eds. 2001). See Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§1461-1468 (1998)); see also National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 
1246(1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1716 (1988).
83
 David Dante Troutt, Ghettos Made Easy:  The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and the Legal 
Challenges of the Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 427, 507 n. 146 (2002) 
(stating that the FHA’s new lending model allowed for smaller down payments, lower interest rates, longer 
repayment periods, and full loan amortization, making it easier for many homeowners to buy rather than 
rent).  
84
 See id. Troutt notes that between 1936 and 1941, new home owners increased from 332,000 to 619,000. 
See id.
85 See http://www.columbia.edu/~rr91/3082_lectures/feminine_mistique.htm, visited on January 11, 2003.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.  William Levitt became:
the Henry Ford of home building by applying methods of mass production to housing.  In the late 
forties, William Levitt embarked on the biggest private housing project in American history.  
Buying up 4,000 acres of potato fields in Hempstead, Long island, about 25 miles east of new 
York City, he started work on 17,500 homes in what was to be known as Levittown.  To minimize 
costs, he broke down construction into 26 steps.  Teams of workers executed specific tasks: 
bulldozing the land, paving the roads, pouring foundations, [planting trees, joining the walls and 
roof, installing the plumbing and electricity, and painting.  Every house was identical, one story 
high, covering 25 by 32 feet, with a living room, kitchen, two bedrooms and a bathroom.  ….
Those cape cod homes became the single most powerful symbol of the dream of upward mobility 
and home ownership for American families.  With no down payment, a 30-year mortgage, and a 
tax deduction for interest payments, it was cheaper to buy a house in Levittown, where mortgage 
costs ran $56 per month, than to rent an apartment in New York, where apartment rentals averaged 
$93 per month. 
Id. 
89
 Electronic interview between Frederick Hart and Polly Dwyer, President of Levittown Historical Society, 
on January 11, 2003.  The rate was 4 ½% if there was no down payment and 4% if the purchaser put down 
13
These events forever changed the face of American consumerism and consumer 
credit.  They ultimately revolutionized the home finance industry, by making 20% down 
payments the norm, rather than the previous 50% required,90 and by stretching home 
loans out 25 or 30 years, as compared to the three years at which commercial banks were 
lending, and finally, by amortizing the loans rather than having them end with balloon 
payments.91  As a result of these and other more recent changes, 68% of Americans now 
own their homes,92 a percentage higher than most other countries in the world.93  The 
New Deal Legislation unquestionably led to this result, and, along with the advent of 
private mortgage insurance, now allows Americans to buy a home with only 5% down.94
These conditions lead to more disposable income for Americans than any other group of 
citizens in the world.95
Low down-payment loans in the United States have led to another uniquely 
American phenomenon, the home equity loan. Home equity loan indebtedness has 
substantially increased in a short period of time, from $60 billion in 1981 to $357 billion 
in 199196.  These types of loans are pushed non-stop through the media in the U.S., yet 
$990.  See id; see also The Next Crash:  Is the Housing Market a Bubble that’s About to Burst?, THE NEW 
YORKER, November 11, 2002, at 123 (discussing the Levittown development project). 
90 See MARC A., WEISS, RISE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND 
URBAN PLANNING  32 (1987).  Weiss states that the FHA began making 80% loans for 20 years when the 
previous norm for commercial banks was 50% loans for three years.  Twenty years later, the FHA began 
making 90% loans for 25 years.  See id.
91 See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUB-URBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 204 
(1985).
92 See  Local & The Carolinas Coastal Business, SUN-NEWS (Myrtle Beach, S.C.), April 6, 2002, at D1 
(reporting a 67.8% home ownership rate in April of 2002, and noting that the Great plains and the Great 
Lakes region had a rate of 73.9% and 72.7% percent respectively but that the Pacific Coast had a rate of 
just 59.6%, showing a large variation across the country); see also REALTY TIMES, October 22, 1998, 
http://realtytimes.com/news/rtcpages/19981022-hmownership.htm, visited on February 23, 2004 (reporting 
a 66.8% home ownership rate in October of 1998); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/ann01ind.html, visited on January 17, 2003.
93
 New Zelanders purportedly have the highest home ownership rate at 72% with Australia in second place 
at 70.1%.  See Australia Has World’s Second Highest Home Ownership Rate, ASIA PULSE, February 11, 
2002. The U.S. is next at 67%, see Local & The Carolinas Coastal Business, supra note 96, at D1, and 
Britain is next at 66%. See Not a Common European Home Economic Agenda, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH ( 
LONDON), August 18, 2002. Continental Europe ‘s rate is currently 59%, but of course, this number 
represents an average of a number of different rates across Europe.  See id.
94
 Anyone who watches late night television knows that if you buy from the owner or the builder you can 
often buy a home with no money down in the United States.
95
 In Europe, a buyer seeking a loan from a lending institution is still expected to put down 50% in order to 
get a home loan.  http://www.remx-oa.com/resource/BuyersGuide/Arranging/Default.asp, visited on March 
2, 2004. Even in Canada, 25% is a typical down payment. See id. Moreover, in many countries, homes can 
only be purchased with cash.  See id.
96 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY:  MANY FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROWTH IN 
HOME EQUITY FINANCING IN THE 1980’S 3, 12-14 (1993). While home equity loans grew at a rate of 20% 
per year between 1981-1991, other consumer debt increased by just 4% per year supra at 1. For a more 
detailed exploration of the dilemma with home equity loans See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the 
American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing,  69 
TUL.L.REV. 373, 373 (1994).
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are virtually unheard of in Europe. 97  In fact, European concepts of land ownership are 
completely different from U.S. concepts. The ownership of land and tenant rights in 
England had their origin in the feudal system imposed by William I 98 with far more land 
owned publicly and far more people owning homes and businesses on leased land.  Thus, 
there are far fewer home equity loans in Europe and the rest of the world and thus less 
overall indebtedness.99
Lending found its true cornucopia in America, however, with the introduction of 
the charge card in the 1960’s, followed by the credit card in the 1970’s and 1980’s.100
Since then, there has been no turning back.
B.  American Consumer Culture:  Buying Happiness
Americans are considered profligate in their personal lives as well as their 
business lives, particularly in comparison to other world citizens.101  While the last sub-
section attempts to explain how these habits developed, this sub-section examines how 
our society views debt today, and what current legal, cultural, and economic factors have 
led to our “compulsively consumeristic” behavior.102  It also examines the financial and 
other life conditions of most individual bankruptcy debtors in American, and discusses 
whether there is a different bankruptcy or debt culture for American business debtors, as 
compared to individual consumer debtors. 103
1.  How and Why We Spend it: Let us Count the Ways
97
  A recent radio advertisement asks “Did you know that there currently is available over $30 billion in 
equity in American real estate?”,  it then admonishes listeners not to let this money waste and to call an 800 
number immediately to get the cash they deserve out of their home.
98
 Lord Madoc Arundel and Christopher T.C. Miller, The Governance of Real Property in England from 
Henry I to the Second Reiteration of Magna Carta, http://www.pbm.com/~lindahl/articles/land_law.html, 
visited on Nov. 5, 2003.
99 With this background, we can begin to understand how our bankruptcy system of debt forgiveness came 
into being. What is not clear is whether the countries that are importing aspects of our bankruptcy system 
actually need this system or will need it.  Will they also become highly consumeristic because that is where 
globalization will take them? Some Europeans, for example, are known for having one small closet filled 
with a few expensive pieces of clothing whereas Americans prefer a huge closet full of moderately priced 
items, a reflection of differing consumer cultures.  Not all Europeans are cut from the same spending mold, 
however.  The Italians love beautiful things while northern Europeans would consider high-ticket fashion 
items to be highly unnecessary.
100 See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1055, 1064 (2002).  As Mann explains, American Express, Diner’s Club, and Carte Blanche first offered 
charge cards, which, as their name implies, had to be paid off each month.  The big profits occurred with 
the development of the credit card, and the resulting high interests rates to lenders.  These did not blossom 
until the 1970’s and the 1980’s in the United States and still have not done so throughout the rest of the 
world.  See id. Mann attempts to explain this phenomenon by examining the banking and lending systems 
of the U.S. versus other parts of the worlds, particularly Japan.  See id. at 1061-64.
101
 Jacob S. Ziegel, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt, Discussed from a Canadian Perspective, 
79 TEX. L REV.1241, 1244 (2001).
102 See id. 
103 See THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 2 (discussing how increased volatility in the job 
market, exploding amounts of available consumer credit, and privatized health care, all helped lead to 
record bankruptcy numbers in recent years).
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Consumer spending is considered one of the most important indicators of 
economic health in the American economy. 104  Despite the credit industry’s claims that 
consumers are abusing credit, credit industry advertising encourages people to use as 
much credit as they can get, for every use imaginable or no particular use at all.105 Some 
advertisers rely on nostalgia to get people to borrow as much money as possible.  For 
example, in a mailer for a home equity loan, United Pan Am Mortgage writes: 
[r]emember the days when dad worked, mom managed the home, and there was 
still enough money for a house, cars, vacations …even college?  It’s sure not like 
that anymore.  Today, with single parents or even with both parents working, it’s 
hard to make ends meet, let alone have some of the good things life offers.  We 
think you deserve more and we can help. …A friendly phone call will get the ball 
rolling on putting a lump sum in your pocket.  That’s right –have the extra cash to 
make those home improvements you’ve been putting off, take that vacation 
you’ve been dreaming about, give yourself peace of mind, knowing your son or 
daughter’s tuition is covered.106
The ad goes on to tell the recipient who to call to get a home equity loan and solve all of 
life’s problems, demonstrating that despite popular belief, you can buy both happiness 
and peace of mind.107
American popular culture oozes with references of spending and happiness.  In 
the tongue-in-cheek novel, Shopaholic Ties the Knot,108 Becky Bloomwood notes how 
her whole life will change when she and her beau own the vintage cocktail cabinet she 
spots in an antique shop:
104
 Consumer spending is one of the major indicators by which the government and economists measure the 
strength of our economy.  Consumer spending makes up about two-thirds of our gross domestic product, 
which is the broadest measure of economic health. When will we Spend Again?, supra note 8. 
Consumer spending is widely believed to be a measure of overall consumer confidence.  When a 
household is deciding what it can afford, it will look at probable future income as well as current income.  
If consumers are optimistic about the future economy, they will be inclined to spend their dispensible 
income.  If, however, they do not believe that good times lay ahead, they are more likely to save their 
money.   THOMAS MAYER, JAMES S. DUESENBERRY & ROBERT ALIBER,  MONEY, BANKING, AND THE 
ECONOMY 273 (Norton & Co. 1999).  
105
  One advertisement admonishes Americans to get the money they deserve by tapping into the $30 
trillion dollars in equity currently available in American real estate.  No mention is made of the need to pay 
such funds back.  In a title loan company add, a woman finds that as long as she takes out a title loan, she 
has the money to go out to dinner after all.    In another add, Mr. T tells a huge, slovenly debtor that all his 
financial problems can be solved if he takes out a title loan. See Appendix, Case Study #4.  In a MasterCard 
advertisement, a man in cubicle becomes ecstatic beyond words when he wins a trip to Hawaii from his 
benevolent credit card company.  Businesses advertising on every network offer free credit for 6-12 
months, as long as you spend a certain dollar amount, and even the government told Americans to go out 
and spend money last fall (despite high bankruptcy rates and low savings rates) in order to breath life into 
out flagging economy.
106
 Sent to Professor Frederick M. Hart on September 30, 2002, on file with the author.
107
 See id.
108 SOPHIE KINSELLA, SHOPAHOLIC TIES THE KNOT 8 (Delta 2002).
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Just think, if we had one of these in the apartment it would change our lives.  
Every night Luke and I would mix martinis, and dance to old-fashioned songs, 
and watch the sun go down. It’d be so atmospheric!  We’d have to buy one of 
those old-fashioned record players with the big horns, and start collecting 78s, and 
I’d start wearing gorgeous, vintage tea dresses.109
As a result of relentless and unyielding admonitions to spend, as well as other 
cultural factors, Americans have more debt of all kinds than all persons of all other parts 
of the world.110 Consumer debt, second mortgages, foreclosures,111 and personal 
bankruptcies are all at an all-time high.112  The average household carries $8,000113 in 
credit card debt and record numbers of Americans now carry more than one mortgage.114
Between 1979 and 1997, personal bankruptcies increased by more than 400%.115 The 
upsurge in the mid-nineties was particularly shocking because this was a period of 
widespread economic recovery.116  History partially explains why this debt picture looks 
so different from that of the rest of the world. Add a volatile economy and job market, 
109 Id.
110
 I respectfully disagree with Professor Ronald Mann’s conclusion that neither Japanese nor American 
consumers are encouraged to over-extend.  See Mann, supra note 100, at 1108 n. 107 (citing Robert D. 
Manning, CREDIT CARD NATION:  THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO CREDIT 3 (2002).  
Mann cites Robert Manning’s Credit Card Nation for the proposition that American society does not 
venerate those who rely on credit beyond their income.  See id.   Unfortunately, I believe that Manning just 
a voice in the wilderness on this point, American media having won the war against sensible credit use.
Personally, I find it impossible to spend a quiet evening at home without being barraged by credit 
card and home refinancing options.  New on the scene are those irritating and  relentless “non-profit” credit 
consolidation companies, who call as many as four times per week, insisting they can lower our huge 
monthly payments, even though we do not carry a balance at all. 
 We also have found it next to impossible to cancel a credit card, being recently offered a waiver 
of the monthly fee, and finally, a free airline ticket, if we would just not cancel. 
111
 Thomas A Fogarty, A record Number of U.S. Homeowners are Facing Foreclosure, and Many More 
Are Falling Behind,  September 11, 2002, http://www.survivalforum.com/modules.php?name=News&new-
topic=23, visited on January 13, 2003. Fogarty reports that during April, May and June of 2002, 1.23% of 
all mortgages- or 640,000 - were in foreclosure.  See id. This is the highest rate recorded in the 30 years in 
which this data has been kept, and is up from 1% just one year ago.  See id.
112 See http/:abiworld.org/statistics, visited on December 4, 2003.  Yet at least one scholar has wondered 
why more U.S. households do not file for bankruptcy, concluding that as of 1998, only about 1% of 
households  file but 15% could benefit from such a filing.  See Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More 
Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L.ECON. 205-31 (1998). 
113
 See http://www.cardweb.com/cardlearn/faqs/2003/jan/8.xcml, visited on March 26, 2003.
114
 See Riva D. Atlas, Home Equity Borrowing Rises to Worrisome Levels, N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 2003 
(stating that home equity loan levels have reached such a high level that consumer groups think many 
people will be unable to service these loans and will end up homeless). Some lenders, including Wells 
Fargo Bank, are even ending up to 100% of the home’s value, despite that people often have insufficient 
income to service such loans.  Id.
115 See FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 3.  Since World War II, personal bankruptcies have 
steadily increased most years. These increases accelerated during the 1980’s and 1990’s, frequently 
breaking records from quarter to quarter and year to year. See id
116
 See id. As the authors state, financial collapse amidst all this prosperity was both mystifying and 
worrisome.  See id.
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and the credit industry’s voracious appetite for more lending and the statistics are not 
surprising. 117
2. Personal Bankruptcy and Stigma in The United States
While some people insist that the stigma of bankruptcy is gone,118 empirical 
research suggests that it may not be that simple.119  In their empirical Study, The Fragile 
Middle Class, scholars and empiricists Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook, conclude that 
bankruptcy is a treatment of a financial problem but is not itself the disease.120  They 
conclude that unemployment or underemployment, illness and divorce are the primary 
causes of bankruptcy in American, but that huge amounts of consumer debt in general 
and credit card debt in particular, lower Americans’ threshold for collapse when financial 
disasters strikes. 121
Credit card use in the United States has risen steadily every year since the cards 
were introduced.122 In the fifteen years from 1980 to 1995, the amount of outstanding 
revolving credit jumped sevenfold.  123Credit card debt doubled in just four years, from 
$211 billion in 1993 to $422 billion in 1997.   Both the number of cards and the balances 
increased dramatically in this time period, yet three and a half billion credit card 
solicitations were sent out thereafter in 1998, portending continuing increases.124  One 
historical event explains the rise in credit card debt, namely deregulation of consumer 
interest rates, which has made credit card lending more profitable than any other form of 
117
 Department of Labor Statistics indicate that between 1995 and 1997, eight million American workers 
were displaced, and that by 1998, 50% were reemployed at their old salaries, 25% were earning 20% less, 
and the other 25% were still unemployed.  See FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 17. 
118
 This is a constant claim of the credit industry, though one credit card company’s own web page states 
that “ While not definitive, the research appears to confirm the suspicion that bankruptcy no longer carries 
the serious social stigma it once did.  While many of the debtors expressed remorse over having to file for 
bankruptcy, many appeared to take a more relaxed attitude.”  See
http://www.abiworld.org/stats/visa/97qualitative.html, visited on March 2, 2004.  This is hardly strong 
proof that stigma is gone. See Once a stigma, Ch. 11 Seen as Management Tool, BOSTON BUSINESS 
JOURNAL, July 12, 2002, at B1; Gregory E. Maggs, Book Review:  Bankruptcy as a Business Tool, 71 TEX. 
L. REV. 681, 684-87 (describing the development of strategic uses for Chapter 11, while reviewing a book 
who’s name speaks for itself); Bankruptcy Boom, www.abcnews.com, August 15, 2002, visited on January 
8, 2003;  Explaining the Escalation in Personal Bankruptcies, www.spotlightonfinance.org, visited on 
January 8, 2003.
119 See THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 263.
120 See id.
121
 See id. at 22. While only 10% of the consumers in their empirical study reported that consumer or credit 
card debt as the actual cause of their bankruptcy, in most cases, the debtor could have withstood the layoff, 
illness or family breakup, if not for their crushing amounts of consumer debts.  See id.
122 See id. at 123.
123
 By the 1990’s economists speculated that Americans could tolerate no more credit card debt.  Since 
1993, however, growth in credit card debt has been greater than any other type of consumer loan.  See id.
124
  The bankruptcy debtors in the study carried more credit card debt than the average American, but most 
Americans are now carrying more than they can afford to repay.  This is because there is virtually no limit 
to the amount of credit a person can obtain through credit cards. See id. 
The credit card industry did not grow to its current size by being cautious about distributing cards.
See id. at 135.  It grew because it distributed cards freely, and solicited new customers relentlessly, at a cost 
of $100 in solicitation for every new card member acquired in 1994.
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lending.125  The more cardholders a company has, the more money it makes, even if this 
is accomplished by lowering lending standards. 126
Sub-prime lending, meaning lending specifically to people who are living on the 
edge, is the most profitable niche in lending.127  Yet traditional banking has declined in 
profitability, making it necessary for lenders to make ends meet in other ways. A popular 
long-term strategy is to get college students hooked on credit cars early, giving away free 
t-shirts and requiring no income.128 Sixty nine-percent of students in 1999 had a credit 
card and 20% had four or more.129
The existence of all this consumer credit does not mean that people do not feel 
guilty when they fail to keep up with their payments. Studies show that most people feel 
badly when they are unable to pay their debts,130 despite deep societal ambivalence about 
consumer debt.131 Economists recommend that people save more to increase capital 
investment and productivity while at the same time warning that increased consumption 
is necessary to economic growth.132  In mainstream American news media, such as the 
Wall Street Journal, consumer spending is consistently equated with happiness and 
health.133   For example, in an Article titled Consumers Give Brighter Outlook, the author 
claims that “[c]onsumers’ spirits picked up a bit in early December, an encouraging sign 
for retailers hoping for a strong holiday season.”134 The story then claims that “consumer 
125 See id.
126
 Interest rates drive profitability and interest payments account for more than 80% of the profits of credit 
card companies. The enormous profits available from people who charge up to the limit and pay only the 
minimum monthly payment make delinquent cardholders the most valued customers in the business. See id.
127 See id. at 135-36.
128 See id. 137.
129 See id.  In fact, some state legislatures have attempted to stem this tide by placing additional legal 
guidelines and restrictions on credit card issuers who issue cards to minors.  Unfortunately, these efforts 
have not been very successful.  See  http://www.cardtrak/1999/march1.html., visited on January 13, 2002, 
(reporting that on March 26, 1999, the Oklahoma state legislature declined to pass a law restricting 
offerings to citizens under the age of 21).
130 See THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note  77, at 139-40. We are, however, an immediate 
gratification society with little willpower, a fact also demonstrated by our national obsession with food and 
weight loss, and our well-documented obesity problems.
131 See id. at 23.
132
 See Bankruptcy Blues Generate Consumer Blahs, http://today.uci.edu/releses/95releases/079ky95.html. 
Moreover, in the wake of September 11th, President Bush told us that we could all fight terrorism by being 
good consumers.  George W. Bush, Speech to Congress, (Washington D.C.,  September 20, 2001) 
(accessed from ABCNEWS.com, visited on January 6, 2003).   The Federal Reserve then encouraged 
consumer spending by repeatedly cutting interest rates over the next few months. U.S Economy Shrinks, 
October 31, 2001, www.cnn.com, visited on January 7, 2003.  Again on January 7, 2003, President Bush 
delivered a speech in which he encouraged Americans to be good consumers in spite of the economic 
stand-still.  George W. Bush, Speech to Economic Club of Chicago, (Chicago, Illinois, January 7, 2003).
133 WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 16, 2002, at A2.
134 See id  This top financial newspaper often devotes an entire two-page spread to bankruptcy and 
consumer sentiments every singly day.  For example, on Monday, December 16, 2002, a fairly typical day, 
the feature story contained a comparison of Australian bankruptcy and U.S. bankruptcy, the sideline was 
about United Airlines’ request to borrow $2.4 billion from its union’s pension plan to fund its Chapter 11, 
along with this story about whether consumer spending would be “bright” enough to give retailers a 
profitable Christmas season.
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sentiment” and “consumer attitudes” have improved, causing economists to conclude that 
the waning economy might be improving.135
The nature of the U.S. economic system, however, makes some financial failure a 
certainty.  The dynamics of capitalism, combined with a thin social safety net, guarantee 
that some families will fail: 
[w]ithout universal health insurance to protect every family from the financial 
ravages of illness and without higher levels of unemployment compensation to 
cushion the effects of a layoff, each day, in good times and in bad, some families 
will fall over the financial edge.  And in a market that provides virtually unlimited 
amounts of consumer credit, some people will accumulate a debt load that 
eventually takes on a life of its own – swelling on compound interest, default 
rates, and penalty payments until it consumes every available dollar of income 
and still demands more.  Just as the poor will always be with us, so will the 
bankrupt middle class.136
A more protective consumer bankruptcy system seems to be directly related to the size of 
the social safety net and the availability of consumer credit. 137  The United States 
admittedly offers more families sanctuary in bankruptcy while at the same time offering a 
wide open consumer credit economy with no limit on lending or interest rates, and few 
protections from the economic consequences of other problems such as job loss, illness, 
accidents and family breakdowns. 138 None of this makes bankruptcy pleasant, although 
135
 News stories of this kind equate good “moods” or “spirits” with high consumer spending, even though 
more personal financial failures occur after the holidays than at any other time of year.  It is not surprising 
that we have as much debt as we do, when we are told that spending on consumer goods is critical to 
keeping our economy viable. See id
136 FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 3.  Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook uncover a few surprising 
facts about bankruptcy debtors in this study, including that bankruptcy rates are very similar across racial 
and ethnic lines, see id. at 41-47, that bankruptcy debtors come from a cross-–section of occupations, see 
id. at 55-58, that debtors tend to be from the middle rather than the lower classes, see id. at 59, and that 
bankruptcy debtors are more likely to have attended college than the average citizen, see id. at 51-55.  This 
last statistic can be read several different ways.  What the study actually showed was that bankruptcy 
debtors were more likely to have attended college than the general population but less likely than average 
to have graduated from college.  Thus, more went to college but few graduated.  Is it possible that the study 
actually showed that bankruptcy debtors were more likely to try new things but less likely to stick with 
them? These are not the conclusions drawn by the authors, see id., but the numbers did suggest these 
alternative conclusions to me.
137
 See id. at 259.
138 See id Whether these high levels of consumer bankruptcies are seen as a societal problem or not, it is 
clear that consumer bankruptcy is the ultimate free-market solution to bad debt. It forces individual 
creditors who have made voluntary decisions to lend to recoup the losses from bad loans, from the profits 
of the good ones.  And recoup they have, earning the highest profits in lending history despite all the 
defaults. Bankruptcy is the market-driven choice to deal with privatized rather than socialized risk. 
Moreover, while creditor-funded campaigns to restrict consumers’ access to bankruptcy have both popular 
and successful in Congress, there have been no campaigns to restrict access to credit.  That type of 
legislation would be seen as anti-capitalist and paternalistic.  Many would say that individuals should be 
allowed to make their own choices about credit, and should be responsible for their own decision-making 
and the resulting consequences. See id.
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at least it is available.139 While there may be more people filing for personal bankruptcy 
in the United States than ever before, the “sting of failure is still sharply felt by those who 
must publicly declare that they are bankrupt.”140 And, while some Americans may try to 
buck the trend and consume less, strong societal pressures keep most of us spending. 141
3.  Business Bankruptcy and Stigma in the United States.
When it comes to stigma, however, business bankruptcy in America is an entirely 
different matter. 142  There seems to be less stigma associated with a failing business in 
America than with a personal bankruptcy, probably due to our capitalist notion that some 
risk is good and necessary to a well-functioning capitalist economy.  We consider 
business failure to be negative but not morally wrong.  We rarely throw corporate officers 
in jail for failing at business.  In fact, in some industries, like the high-tech or dot.com 
industries, going through a business failure can actually be seen as a badge of honor, 
proof that the entrepreneurs were willing to take the kinds of risks necessary to fuel 
capitalism. 143
139
 Data collected by the Consumer Federation of America suggests that despite the constant barrage of 
solicitations, acceptance of new cards has finally stemmed to some extent.  See
http://www.consumerfed.org/backpage/081402, visited on August 26, 2002. In the 12-month period ending 
March 3, 2002, card issuers mailed five billion solicitations, nearly 50 per household.  They now make 
available more than $3 billion in unused credit, or $30,000 per household.  Yet consumers are increasingly 
rejecting more of these solicitations and refusing to expand their lines of credit.  During the first three 
months of 2002, revolving consumer debt declined by 29 billion, bringing the ratio of credit used to a low 
of 22.1.See id. There is some indication that Brits are also cutting back a bit on credit.  The Credit Card 
research group (CCRG) reports that total credit card spending in the U.K. rose to 16.8 billion pounds, up 
6.9% from the prior period.  This rate of growth, while high, is lower that the increase for the same period 
last year , which was 10%. See Credit Card Spending Eases, BBC News, November 6, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2409655.stm., visited on January 2, 2003.  
My own sense is that if means testing is implemented in the U.S., this may eventually backfire on 
the credit industry and cause at least the educated middle-class consumers to use less credit, thus reducing 
the industry’s profit margins.  If this happens, the industry may respond by granting more credit to less 
educated and poorer consumers, increasing the gap between the haves and the have-nots. No doubt, the 
credit industry is already recognizing that the new bill might not be good for business.  In one article, the 
banking industry itself stated that “[t]he one-sided provisions of this bill are bad news for consumers. But
they are also bad news for our industry. Consumers are our customers. By creating a form of debt 
imprisonment, this bill will hobble the most important player in the world economy -- the American 
consumer.”  See Bankruptcy Bill Hurts Odds of Second Chance 
,http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/invest/extra/P76658.asp, visited on March 4, 2004.
140 See id. at 260.
141
 For help scaling back, see Bankrate’s Guide to Managing Credit, http://www.bankrate.com/news/credit-
management, visited on March 2, 2004; NoDebtNoStress, http://home.quixnet/~meirich, visited on March 
2, 2004.
142
 Stephanie Gruner, Seeking a Second Chance: Is Failure Still a Dirty Word?” Wall Street Journal, June 
21, 1999, at A1; see also Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start:  Stigma on Failure and Legal Consequences of 
Bankruptcy, http/:europa.eu.int/comm./enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/failu…/bankruptcy.ht 
(report of U.S.), visited on March 17, 2003 (stating that although the stigma associated with filing for 
Chapter 11 has diminished substantially, “the decision to file for Chapter 11 is never an easy one.”).
143 See Gruener, supra note 142, at A1 (stating that while it is sometimes considered a positive thing when a 
U.S. entrepreneur fails in business, the same cannot be said in Europe, where considerable stigma still 
exists). 
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In other industries, we seem to recognize as a society that one-time events can 
cause business failure or that sometimes a change in market conditions cannot be 
predicted and is better softened by Chapter 11 if the company is at stake.  In any case, we 
do not like business failure but we find it more acceptable than personal bankruptcy.144
This distinction appears to be shared throughout most of the world.  Unlike the rest of the 
world, however, we also recognize that personal financial failure can be caused by 
business failure, and thus provide systems to help both failing businesses and failing 
individuals.145
C. Thumbnail sketch of the American Systems: Debt Forgiveness for both 
Individuals and Business
The bankruptcy systems that have resulted from the history, politics, and culture 
discussed above are also unique.  First and foremost, they allow each bankruptcy debtor a 
choice about whether to attempt to pay back creditors or to just give up and walk away 
from debt.146  This choice is generally not available in other parts of the world. 147
Moreover, as discussed below, businesses that are reorganizing can continue to operate 
through a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding that is not overseen by a court-appointed 
administrator.148
1. Personal Bankruptcy in America:  An Overview 
144
 This could also be due to the uniquely American corporate concepts of limited liability, given that we 
tend to see businesses as entities separate and apart from their owners and managers. See Joseph A. 
McCahery, Comparative Perspectives on the Evolution of the Unincorporated Firm:  An Introduction, 26 J. 
CORP. LAW, 803, 807 (2001) (discussing how some European scholars believe, for example, that extending 
limited liability to small firms will cause moral hazard and that as such, the costs of extending limited 
liability to such firms would outweigh the benefits to society of doing so).
145
 Bi-partisan politics continue to play an important role in the development of bankruptcy laws, though in 
some respects these politics are counter-intuitive.  The credit industry, particularly the consumer credit 
industry, has pushed tremendously in recent years for stricter bankruptcy laws for consumers, that require 
larger paybacks on old debts.  These sentiments, though not entirely partisan, are generally thought to be 
Republican or conservative sentiments.  Underlying these views is a strong belief that individuals have 
irresponsibly overspent. Yet Republican or big-business interests, or even those interested in fueling the 
economy, have consistently admonished Americans to do the right thing and spend even more, for the sake 
of economic growth. This seems inconsistent with the bankruptcy crack-down, given that the government 
official who have admonished us to spend, as a group, know full well that most people now have more debt 
than they can repay and that savings rates are now negative in the U.S.   Spending without going into debt 
is not an economic reality, yet we are still encouraged to do it. Moreover, the much-decried bankruptcy 
crack-down is most likely to hurt consumer credit interests rather than help them, when people reduce 
spending in reaction to the bankruptcy crack-down.
On the other side of this political coin, it is no less ironic.  Very liberal persons, though certainly 
not all democrats, favor debtor-oriented bankruptcy laws like the ones in place now. However, some of 
these people believe that excess spending on the part of Americans is so harmful to society that it could 
ultimately destroy the world and its resources. While this would be deeply disturbing if true, the idea of not 
spending is almost un-American.  Clearly, Americans operate in a culture of consumption and spending 
unlike any other in the world.
146 SKEEL supra note 37, at 1-2.
147 See id.
148 See id.
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Personal bankruptcies in the United States take one of two general forms.  One 
can either give up all of one’s non-exempt assets,149 in exchange for an almost immediate 
discharge of most of one’s unsecured debts,150 or one can choose to pay off creditors, 
either in whole or in part over a period of three to five years, in which case one does not 
need to give up his or her non-exempt assets as long as he or she pays at least the value of 
those non-exempt assets to creditors under the payout plan.151 Again, the debtor, rather 
than creditors, makes this choice.152 The pay-out style bankruptcy also allows one to cure, 
stretch out and sometimes reduce, secured debt that has gone into default, thereby forcing 
new payment terms on the secured creditor, who is precluded from repossessing its 
149
 In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy an estate is created to collect and sell property to satisfy the debt 
of the debtor.  However, a debtor can claim certain assets exempt from the bankruptcy estate 
not to be sold for the benefit of the creditors.  “The historical purpose of exemption laws has 
been to protect a debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so 
that even if his creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left 
destitute and a public charge.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6087.  In the United States a debtor filing bankruptcy may choose between 
the federal or state exemptions, See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b) if the state the debtor is filing has not 
“opted-out” of the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme.  Some examples in the federal 
exemption system are: 1) up to $17,425 of equity in real or personal property used as a 
homestead (11 USCA § 522 (d) (1)), 2) up to $2,775 in one motor vehicle (§ 522 (d) (2),( 3) 
up to $9,300 in household furnishings (§ 522 (d) (3),( 4) up to $1,150 of jewelry (§ 522 (d) 
(4)), 5) $925 in any property (usually checking accounts) and if the debtor did not use the 
homestead exemption up to an additional $8,725 (§ 522 (d) (5), 6) up to $1,750 in professional 
books or tools of the trade (§ 522 (d) (6)), and the debtors right to receive payment for certain 
things such as social security, veteran benefits, and alimony (§ 522 (d) (10)) (all the dollar 
figures are updated by the United States Congress periodically to reflect economic conditions).  
State exemption schemes were developed not because of bankruptcy but because collection 
laws.  Because each state has their own exemption legislation there is a quite a bit of difference 
between states.  A person filing in Delaware, which has opted-out of the federal scheme, can 
only choose the Delaware exemptions which are not generous.  For example a debtor can only 
exempt books, clothing, a seat or a pew in church, sewing machines, tools of the trade (limited 
to a certain amount is some counties, and pianos (See 10 Del. C. §4902).  Delaware does not 
even have any type of homestead exemption.  Texas allows not only unlimited homestead 
exemptions (see Tex. Prop. Code§40.01), but also up to $30,000 in personal property which 
includes household furniture, tool and equipment, clothing, jewelry, firearms, and motor 
vehicles (see Tex. Prop. Code§42.002). But Texas does not allow a checking account to be 
exempt like the federal exemptions.  Unlike Texas, Florida has opted out of most of the federal 
exemptions (see Fla. Stat. § 222.20 (2002)) (Florida allows all federal §522 (d) (10) 
exemptions).  Florida also has an unlimited homestead exemption (Fla. Const. Art. I, § 4(a)(1) 
(2002)).  However, Florida has modest personal property exemption. Only up to $1,000 in 
personal property (Fla. Const. Art. I, § 4(a)(2) (2002)) (Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (2002)) and money 
contributed to retirement funds (§222.21) and college trust funds (§222.22).
150
  This is considered a straight liquidation bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code.  See 11 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq.
151
 This is considered a restructured debt plan under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. See
11 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq.
152
 See SKEEL, supra note 37, at 2.
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collateral as long as the plan payments are made.153 Additionally, Chapter 7 bankruptcy is 
almost entirely non-interventionist because, assuming there is no objection from a 
creditor to a debtor’s discharge, the debtor is granted a discharge automatically.154
The U.S. personal bankruptcy system is unquestionably the most forgiving in the 
world, and strongly encourages persons who have failed financially to get back into the 
economy and try again.155  In many states, the exemptions are extremely generous, 
sometimes allowing individual debtors to an unlimited amount of equity in a home.156
Research suggests that states with higher exemptions, and that thus allow an individual 
debtor to keep more assets free from creditor claims, have the highest levels of 
entrepreneurship in the country, again establishing the connection between business 
activity and an incentive to take risks. 
2. The American Business Reorganization Scheme and Its Rationale.
The theory behind a Chapter 11 reorganization case in the United States is that a 
business enterprise157 is often worth more to creditor alive than dead.158  In other words, a 
business may be able to pay creditors more by continuing to operate its business and 
paying creditors a distribution over time from its future profits, rather than simply 
liquidating its assets and paying creditors from the liquidation proceeds. Alternatively, a 
debtor can sell its business as a going concern while in Chapter 11, leaving enough time 
to sell property so that a good price can be realized for the business enterprise, and then 
using the proceeds to pay creditors through what is called a liquidating Chapter 11 
plan.159  In either case, the business is operated for a time while in Chapter 11, in order to 
avoid the waste that could occur if a business with accumulated good will was simply 
liquidated at the first sign of financial failure.160  For the benefit of stakeholders such as 
153 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (b)(2) allowing for the modification of secured claims except secured claims on 
real property.  This option of modifying a secured creditors interest is not available under a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy.
154 See 11 U.S.C §727.
155
 Jacob Ziegel, Canada’s Phased-in Bankruptcy Reform, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 383, 395 (1006).
156
 See Tex. Prop. Code§42.002; Fla. Stat. § 222.20 (both allowing unlimited homestead exemptions).
157
 Chapter 11 is available to corporations, partnerships, as well as individuals.  Because it is complicated 
and expensive in terms of legal fees, an individual normally will file a Chapter 13 instead, if his or her 
debts fall within the debt limitations, namely the debtor has noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of 
less than $290,525 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $871,550.  See 11 US.C § 109 
(e).
158 See Davis, supra note 13, at 253.
159
 In fact, the debtor is permitted to sell off its assets piece-meal in a Chapter 11, even before a plan is 
filed, despite that the formal name of this chapter of the code is reorganization. See Davis; supra note 13, at 
256, about 20-30% of confirmed plans are liquidation plans. See id; see also E. Flynn, Statistical Analysis 
of Chapter 11, 12 (Administrative Office of US Courts, Bankruptcy Division 1989).
160
 The French commercial system takes actual steps to prevent companies from getting into too much 
financial trouble.  Judges of the Commercial courts have the power to summon the CEO of any company 
that appears to be in financial trouble.  Once summoned an informal hearing is held to discuss the 
information gathered by the court (the information is collected by the Clerk of the Court which is also 
basically the Registrar of Companies, which has filed information, such as liens, mortgages, and 
preferences, on each company in the territory).  The CEO is allowed to inform the judge of the types of 
measures the company is taking to right itself.  After the hearing the judge can 1) accept the measures 
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creditors, equity holders or owners, and employees, it is sometimes more efficient and 
less wasteful to allow the business to reorganize its affairs, either through restructuring its 
debt, by obtaining new equity owners or both.161 While this theory is not without its 
critics,162 the overwhelming worldview today is that some system for “rescuing” ailing 
businesses is a pre-condition to maintaining a vibrant, capitalist economy.163
The shocking difference between American-style reorganization and most others 
around the world is that current management of the failing company normally stays in 
place with no administrator directly overseeing the system.164  The historical 
development of this unique system derives from the first railroad reorganizations, which 
were among the first big businesses in America.165  At the time that Monroe Railroad and 
Banking, Co. defaulted on its obligations to its lenders, there was no mechanism in place 
to address this failure other than the lender’s right to foreclose and the court’s equitable 
right to appoint a receiver to take over the debtor’s assets.166  Because piece-meal sale of 
the debtor’s assets would result in great financial loss to all, the court merged these two 
discussed by the CEO, 2) gather more information concerning the company from many sources, 3) the 
CEO can file for a court agent to oversee the company, and 4) urge the CEO to file for protection under
French law. See Views From the Bench, supra note 6, at 536-39.
161
 Sometimes equity is distributed to the unsecured creditor class under the plan of reorganization. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1129.
162
 Some scholars feel that Chapter 11 is not worth its astronomical costs, or its drag on the economy, 
particularly given the relatively low success rate for reorganizing companies.  See Barry E. Adler, 
Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312-13 
(1993); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy A Reply to Warren, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 815, 827-28 (1987) (stating that bankruptcy creates benefits to bankrupt companies that are 
not available to others, creating perverse incentives to file and giving some companies an unfair 
advantage); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Chapter 11 Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 127, 128 (1996); James W. Bowers, Wither What Hits the Fan? Murphy’s Law, Bankruptcy Theory, 
and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27 (1991) (arguing that Chapter 11 
offers little to justify its existence); Michael Bradley and Michael Rosensweig, The Untenable Case for 
Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1049-50 (1992) (arguing that because equity holders rarely recover 
anything in Chapter 11, Chapter 11 should be repealed); Thomas Jackson and Robert Scott, On the Nature 
of Bankruptcy: An Essay and Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditor’s Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 160 
(1981) (questioning the incentives created by the current bankruptcy system). but see Gross, supra note 10, 
at  5 (claiming that 20%, one of the estimates of success rates in Chapter 11, is a respectable rate, and 
evidence of the system’s success).
It is true that Chapter 11 fees are notoriously expensive.  Enron attorneys have spent over $331 
million dollars as of March 2003, and the company was still nowhere near confirming a plan at that time. 
See Kristen Hays, Enron Proposes New Pipeline Business, ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 19, 2002, 2003 WL 
16151125;see also Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 775, 780-81 (1988) (describing the numerous costs and inefficiencies in the current Chapter 11 
scheme). Also, in highly regulated industries, with large infrastructures, critics have argued that the Chapter 
11 of one player in a closed industry can be unfair and harmful to the other firms in the industry, and even 
weaken the other firms, by allowing the company in bankruptcy to externalize pre-petition debts and 
undercut market prices, therefore recovering a greater market share. See Sarah McBride, Australia’s 
Tough-Minded Bankruptcies May Serve as Role Model, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at A1. 
163 See Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 153-54.
164
 While scholars have regularly noted that old management is often replaced with new management as the 
case proceeds, this is often because old management wishes to resign. 
165
 Skeel, supra note 37, at 57.
166 See id.
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legal concepts and ordered that the lender sell the assets all at once, pursuant to a going 
concern sale, rather than piece-meal.167
Amazingly, this tiny innovation in foreclosure practice, which took place in the 
narrow context of failing U.S. railroads, led to a new way of looking at reorganization 
and value.  Lenders continued to threaten foreclosure, but did not  always follow through.  
Moreover, courts began appointing a receiver in each case, who would watch over and 
protect the debtor’s property and to request an injunction against creditor collection 
efforts. 168 This process was known as equity receivership and allowed the business to 
continue in operation while the parties attempted to negotiate a favorable resolution of 
the debt. 169 Ultimately, after many twists and turned, the current Chapter 11 system 
emerged from this humble start.
3. The Logistics of Chapter 11 Business Reorganization.170
Bankruptcy cases, of which Chapter 11 is one kind, are presided over by a 
specialized bankruptcy court, that is part of the federal judicial scheme171. The law in 
place is the Federal Bankruptcy Code,172 although some principles used in bankruptcy 
cases arise from state law173.  When an enterprise is in Chapter 11, it normally operates 
its own business through its pre-filing management.174  No trustee is ordinarily appointed.  
As soon as a debtor files a voluntary175 Chapter 11 case, an automatic stay goes into 
effect, effectively stopping all collection activity against the debtor or any of its property 
of any kind.176  The stay is broad and powerful and even things that one would not think 
would be stay are indeed stayed.177  For example, secured creditors are prohibited from 
taking any action to repossess collateral that they could repossess if not for the 
167 Id.
168 Id.
169
 Id. at 58.
170
 Chapter 11 can also be used by individuals.  See 11 U.S.C.§ 109(d).
171 See 28 U.S.C. §157(a).
172
 11 U.S.C. §§101, et. seq.
173
 For example property exempt from judicial proceedings, see note 146, and concepts of property 
("Unless a particular federal interest requires a different result, property interests are created and defined by 
state law." Butner v. Unites States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
174
 Although it is unusual, a party in interest may seek the removal of the debtor and have a trustee 
appointed by showing cause, such as fraud or mismanagement.  This is in order to protect interests of 
creditors equity hold. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (a); but see In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217 (3rd Cir. 
1989), (in which appellate court reluctantly upheld trial courts decision to appoint a trustee because the 
debtor in possession had been unable to turn company around, debtor had conducted questionable transfers 
of property, virtually violated its fiduciary duty by not pursuing claims to recover such transferred property, 
and where the debtor itself had proven to be dishonest).
175
 In the United States, the vast majority of cases filed under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code are 
voluntary cases. See Nathalie Martin, Que Es La Diferencia?: A Comparison Of The First Days Of A 
Business Reorganization Case In Mexico And The United States, 10 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 73, 75 (2002).
176 See 11 U.S.C. §362.
177 See Martin supra note 175, at 75. “[T]here is a very broad, automatic stay granted in favor of the debtor. 
This stays virtually all collection activity that is out there, … …employee claims, labor claims, every 
lawsuit that is out there.”
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bankruptcy.178  Even the government is precluded from collecting on its claims.179
Virtually all enterprises,180 and even individuals,181 are eligible for Chapter 11 and there 
is no requirement that the debtor be insolvent in anyway.182  Chapter 11 can be used as a 
strategic measure, to stop lawsuits, to stop foreclosures, or for whatever purpose the 
debtor chooses.183  Practically speaking, one of the most beneficial features of Chapter 11 
is the captive audience that the debtor-in-possession has in its bankruptcy judge, who is 
available in record time to hear any emergency that could affect the debtor’s chances at 
rehabilitation.184
The debtor’s goal in the case is to emerge from Chapter 11 with its debts 
restructured and also reduced in amount in most case. This goal is achieved by obtaining 
approval of a Chapter 11 plan outlining how, to what extent and over what time period 
debts will be repaid.185  Creditors are allowed to vote on the debt restructuring plan, thus 
allowing them to choose whether to go along with the debtor’s plan, propose their own 
plan, or choose to liquidate the debtor’s business.186  If the debtor can get most creditors 
to vote in favor of the plan, it can be forced on the dissenting creditors who will also be 
bound by it.187  Sometimes the debtor can approve a plan even if most creditors vote 
against the plan, although this is rare.188
178 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (3).  For a secured creditor, any party in interest for that matter, must ask the 
court for permission to lift the stay in order to proceed for repossession. The court will only grant relief for 
limited circumstances, see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d); see also Martin, supra note167, at 81.
179 See Martin, supra note175, at 79, citing 11 U.S.C. § 362 (stating that even government entities must stop 
all collection efforts, and can only maintain lawsuits against entities in bankruptcy if the issue affects health 
and public safety, which is interpreted very narrowly); see also In re Universal Life Church, Inc., 128 F.3d 
1294 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998)( finding that the Section 362 (b)(4) police and 
regulatory exceptions to an automatic stay “refers to the enforcement of laws affecting health, welfare, 
morals and safety, but not regulatory laws that directly conflict with the control of the res or property by 
the bankruptcy court.”). Id at 1297. The two tests to determine if a government action is police and 
regulatory in nature are the "pecuniary purpose" test and the "public policy" test, id citing NLRB v. 
Continental Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). “Under the pecuniary purpose test, the court 
determines whether the government action relates primarily to the protection of the government's pecuniary 
interest in the debtor's property or to matters of public safety and welfare. [NLRB]. If the government action 
is pursued solely to advance a pecuniary interest of the governmental unit, the stay will be imposed.” Id, 
citing In re Thomassen, 15 B.R. 907, 909 (9th Cir. BAP 1981)
180 See 11 U.S.C. §109 (d), defining who can be a debtor under Chapter 11. Some examples of entities 
excluded from Chapter 11 are insurance companies, banks, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and 
loan association, building and loan association, and homestead association.  These exclusions include both 
domestic and foreign entities.
181 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d).
182 See Martin supra note 175, at 77.
183 See Maggs, supra note 119, at 686 (discussing how Texaco filed its Chapter 11 case in order to delay 
collection on Penzoil’s $10 million judgment, and ultimately to gain leverage to settle the judgment for $3 
million).
184
 For example, United Airlines just discovered that the IRS owes a $360 million tax refund, and because 
United is in bankruptcy, this money will be forthcoming far more quickly than usual.  See IRS Owes United 
$360M Refund: But a Federal Investigation Puts Money on Hold, USA TODAY, March 24, 2003, at B1 
(discussing how the bankruptcy court is involved and how settlement may be forthcoming immediately).
185
 Debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days, see 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2).
186 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)
187 See id.
188 See id.
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Secured creditors are normally paid in full with interest, up to the lesser of the 
amount of the loan or the value of the collateral.  If the debt is undersecured, all the 
deficiency claims become unsecured claims.189  Some creditors, such as taxing authorities 
and employee claims, are entitled to special priority190 and must be paid in full in the 
plan.191  Unsecured creditors are often paid a distribution over time, and are very rarely 
paid in full.  The amounts not paid are discharged at the end of the case and never paid.192
There is no set amount of distribution that unsecured creditors must receive, but the 
debtor needs unsecured creditors’ votes and thus often offers as much as it can afford to 
pay.193
Existing equity can retain their ownership of the debtor firm, but only if the 
unsecured creditors agree or if unsecured creditors are paid in full.194  In a sense, 
creditors get to choose, through the voting rights195, whether to go along with the 
reorganization plan or alternatively, to liquidate the debtor’s business. In reality, 
however, the debtor retains control over the case and the plan process throughout the case 
in most instances, and has the exclusive right to file a plan for at least the first four
months of the case and often much longer.196  This leaves many creditors feeling like 
hostages in a debtor-friendly proceeding.  A case cannot go on forever, however. 197  A 
business that is losing money will be liquidated almost immediately because the case is 
not likely to succeed at reorganization and any delay will hurt creditors.198
D. Conclusions about the American Scheme and its Societal Role.
American bankruptcy systems did not emerge randomly or in a vacuum, but through 
conscious modern and historical decisions about the role of credit and money in 
American society. These attitudes and conditions are unique and are not present in other 
countries, including those countries currently adopting our systems. This may limit the 
effectiveness of the imported systems, and should lead countries that are adopting new 
systems to study other systems as well, and to consider local culture when enacting new 
laws.  
189 See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (a).  “An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the 
estate has an interest… …is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the 
estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is 
an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff 
is less than the amount of such allowed claim.”  This is commonly referred to as bifurcation.
190 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (a)
191 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (9)
192 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (d)
193
 A 30% distribution has always struck me as acceptable, though it depends on the case.
194 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (8).  However, if under a plan a unsecured creditor is impaired by the plan the 
court can still approve the plan if it is shown that the unsecured creditor would have received as much 
under a Chapter 7 liquidation plan, See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (7) (A) (ii).
195 However, if the creditor if the creditor is not impaired by the plan and votes against the plan the Court 
can still verify the plan.  See id.
196 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121.
197 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (11).
198 Id.
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III.  CROSS-CULTURAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEBT:  UNRIPE GROUND FOR 
TRANSPLANTATION
Around the world, people are less forgiving about debt forgiveness than they are 
in the U.S. 199 In some parts of the world, not paying debts is the ultimate disgrace.200  In 
other parts of the world, there simply is no personal bankruptcy system,201 and little in the 
way of business reorganization either.202  Despite this, many countries are starting to 
move toward a U.S. bankruptcy reorganization model for businesses and some are also 
replicating forgiving personal bankruptcy laws.203  Given the unique cultural, economic 
and historical development of the U.S. systems, however, this may be impractical.  This 
Section describes cultural attitudes toward debt in a few other parts of the world, that are 
currently in the process of importing U.S. bankruptcy-style laws.  It suggests that history 
cannot be the sole driving factor in determining which bankruptcy system and philosophy 
a country develops, by describing the very different system and attitudes of England, 204
from which our original bankruptcy system arose. By way of further example, it then 
describes attitudes toward debt and bankruptcy in parts of continental Europe, as well as 
Japan, as a contrast to the American attitudes previously discussed.  The laws of these 
countries are also briefly examined, in order to discuss the role of both transplantation as 
well as local culture, in enacting such laws.205
A. Historical Bankruptcy Perspectives Outside the U.S.: England as an Example
Because of its long history of commerce, England never had to sprint to catch up 
or otherwise create a quick market economy.206  Thus, from its inception, English 
bankruptcy had a very different emphasis and flavor than early American bankruptcy 
law.207  England’s first bankruptcy laws were created in 1543.208  The preamble to this 
law described the bankruptcy debtor as an anti-social, immoral, character who regularly 
199 See infra notes 206-61 and accompanying text.
200 See infra notes 480-90 and accompanying text.
201 See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
202 See infra notes 262-70 and accompanying text.
203 See infra notes 375-86 and accompanying text.
204
 England, as well as Canada and Australia, have relatively lenient personal bankruptcy systems by world 
standards. See Efrat, supra note 3, at 88-90. Other countries that have more lenient personal bankruptcy 
systems, besides the U.S., England, Canada and Australia, include Hong Kong, New Zealand, Taiwan, 
Russia, Scotland and the Netherlands.  Virtually all of these countries impose a Chapter 13-like payment 
plan on at least some bankruptcy debtors before granting them a discharge. See id.
205 See infra notes 233-302, 375-411, 423-443, and 498-507 and accompanying text.
206
 Like many other European nations, it developed its commercial economy over a long period of time, 
with typical ebbs and flows but continued growth from 1805, at the early beginnings of the industrial 
revolution, to the present.
207 See Tabb, History of Bankruptcy supra note 34, at 7 (1995)(noting that early English bankruptcy law 
was harsh).  Professor Tabb notes, however, that English law was hardly unique at the time in its tough 
treatment of bankruptcy debtors.  Common punishments around the world included forfeiture of all 
property, relinquishment of the consortium of a spouse, imprisonment and death.  Early stories claim that in 
Rome, creditors were permitted to carve up the body of a debtor.  See id.
208 See Robert Weisberg, Commercial Mortality, The Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable 
Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 20 (1986). 
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took advantage of others.209  The law itself was designed solely for the benefit of 
creditors and was virtually criminal in nature.210  Bankruptcy was something creditors 
“did” to the debtor, an involuntary social condition to which a naughty use of credit was 
subjected against his will. 211  Not surprisingly, then, early English bankruptcy laws were 
filled with numerous penalties and punishments for non-payment, the most well known 
of which was to “suffer as a felon, without the benefit of clergy,” a polite phrase for the 
death penalty.212  While few were actually subject to death for failing to pay ones bills, 
debtors’ prison was common,213 as was being shunned by society in Dickensian 
fashion.214
There was no debtor discharge, though there was plenty of credit, even as early as 
the 1600’s.215  The first debtor discharge was introduced in the Statute of Anne in 1705, 
209 See id.  The Preamble stated that “Where divers and soondry persones craftelye obteyning into theyre 
hands greate substaunce of other mennes goods doo sodenlie flee to partes unknowne or kepe theyre 
houses, not mynding to paie or restore to any of theyre creditours theyre debtes and dueties, but at theyre 
owne willes and pleasures consume the substaunce obteyned by credyte of other men, for theyre owne 
pleasure and delicate lyving, againste all reasone equity and good conscience . . .” 
210 See id. at 3.
211
 See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge, supra note 34, at, 336 (1991) (stating that in 1542 Parliament enacted 
the first English bankruptcy law, 34 & 35 Henry 8, chapter 4, entitled "An act against such persons as do 
make bankrupts." As the title indicates, the act was not passed with any heed for the interests of the debtor. 
Instead, it was intended to give creditors another collection remedy. The new remedy lay against all 
fraudulent and absconding debtors (but not merely unfortunate debtors), referred to throughout the act as 
"offenders." This act, along with all of the early bankruptcy laws, was quasi-criminal in nature, and 
provided for the imprisonment of the offender if necessary. A British commentator notes that "the law 
seems at that time to have been administered with considerable severity." Id.  Under this act (and for almost 
three centuries hence) bankruptcy was purely involuntary as to the debtor. The right to commence a 
bankruptcy proceeding rested solely in the hands of the creditors of the debtor. This limitation was 
perfectly consistent with the rationale of the act, which was to protect creditors and thus facilitate 
commerce. Upon notice the various assets of the debtor were seized, appraised, and sold, and the proceeds 
were distributed pro rata to all creditors proving just claims. 
The first voluntary bankruptcy in England was passed in 1844 and applied to traders only. See id.
at 353-54.  This was extended to non-merchants in 1861.  See id.
212 See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge supra note 34 at 327;  but see Weisburg supra note 208, at 4. 
Weisburg looks at a 1697 treatise by Daniel Defoe, vocal commentator on bankruptcy law and its impact 
on society. In his “Essay on Projects”, Defoe sets out that the laws of England are, “generally good, and 
above all things are temper’d with Mercy, Lenity, and Freedom. But bankruptcy law has something in it of 
Barbarity; it gives loose to the Malice and Revenge of the Creditor, as well as a Power to right himself, 
while it leaves the Debtor no way to show himself honest: it contrives all the ways possible to drive the 
debtor to despair, encourages no new Industry, for it makes him perfectly incapable of anything but 
starving.” Sentiments such as Defoe’s clearly show that society, as a whole, was conscious of the ill effect 
the law had on the average bankrupt.  Id.
213 See Tabb, History of Bankruptcy, supra note 34, at 7.
214
 For an example of Britain’s historical perception of bankruptcy in the nineteenth century, one should 
read Dickens’ “Little Dorrit.” The story is about a father and his family living and growing up in a debtor’s 
prison (Swansea). Dickens’ tale is not unlike Defoe’s sentiment in supra note 6.  Essentially, the bankrupt 
was treated like a leper, and the prison was like a leper colony Mr. Dorrit, finally gets out of prison, after 
receiving a windfall in inheritance, spends it all, and then dies before being forced to return to debtor’s 
prison. The story’s main focus is on how bankruptcy impacts the family unit, and how it is truly punitive in 
nature. 
215 See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge, supra note 34 at 330.
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but this provision was only in place for three years.216  The debtor discharge later became 
part of the permanent law, but was granted upon application only, rather than 
automatically, after the debtor proved that he had been honest and had cooperated with 
creditors.217 Until 1705, a bankruptcy discharge was only available to merchants, as 
credit was seen as unnecessary and even a fraud if obtained outside the commercial 
context.218 Unlike the early American economic climate, in which every man was seen as 
a potential merchant who could help grow the economy, early English society accepted 
credit only as a necessary evil.219  While laws themselves became more lenient over time, 
this attitude toward debt and credit never really changed.
B.  Attitudes Toward Debt in England Today.
Even today, Brits are sensitive about financial failure.220  They generally consider 
such failure a failure of character and consider it extremely negative if a person, or even a 
business, fails financially.  Strictly personal bankruptcies, resulting from too much credit 
card debt or the loss of a job or good health, have been rare in the past because there was 
little consumer credit, and government programs helped people if they lost employment 
or needed health care.221 Now there is more credit and more personal financial failure.
While the UK certainly has more bankruptcies than the rest of the EU,222 these are 
still considered major embarrassments, even if they result from the failure of a business.
223
  Executives in a company that fails can have a very difficult time finding another job, 
and are often shunned socially.224 Thus, despite all the new credit available, the British 
marketplace comes down hard on those who have gotten into financial difficulty.  The 
216 See id. Tabb also notes that discharge was not automatic. The bankrupt needed to receive a “certificate 
of conformity.” To receive this, the bankrupt needed to voluntarily surrender to an examination by the 
court, full disclosure, and delivery of all the bankrupt’s assets to the court. The court maintained the power 
to deny the certificate, but this discretion was seldom used. What’s interesting is that creditors at the time 
had no power to block the bankrupt’s receipt of the certificate. One could argue that this was one of the first 
pro-debtor bankruptcy law, but as will be seen the act lasted all but three years.  
217 See id. This provision is still popular in the personal bankruptcy laws of many countries today.  See infra
notes 347-70 and accompanying text.
218 See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge, supra note 34, at 331.
219 See Weisberg, supra note 208, at 66.  As Professor Weisberg notes, in the U.S., bankruptcy law was 
seen as a “robust, economical, and scientific instrument of commercial efficiency, in England credit was 
morally-tinged and represented false wealth to many people in traditional land-based society.  See id.
220 See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
221 See James A. Morone and Janice M. Goggin, Health Policies in Europe:  Welfare States in a Market 
Era, 20 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND LAW 557, 558, 563 (1995) (noting that England currently has a 
state-run health care system but that it and other similar European systems may soon be “Americanized”).
222 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 100-01.
223
 As an example of how harsh the “bankrupt” was treated by the early British code, consider that a 
nonconforming bankrupt was subject to the death penalty and that to obtain a discharge the bankrupt had 
“to (i) secure a certificate of conformity from a majority of "bankruptcy commissioners," (ii) obtain such a 
certificate from four-fifths of creditors, in value and number, and (iii) swear that the creditor certificates 
"were obtained fairly and without fraud." Peter V. Pantaleo Basic Business Bankruptcy, 614 PLI/Comm 
7April-May, 1992 
224
 See id.
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attitude is “once a bankrupt, always a bankrupt”.225  The British government now wants 
to change these attitude in order to encourage people who have failed to go back into 
business and help fuel Britain’s flagging economy.226  Yet it is unclear that one can 
change attitudes by changing laws.  The government is likely to be unable to tell people 
how to think or whom to invite to parties, even through drastic legal change.
C. Attitudes Toward Debt in Continental Europe:  Do the Laws Reflect Them? 
Henry Kissinger once said, “when I want to talk to Europe, I don’t know who to 
call.”227  While this may be changing, now that the European Union is working on 
unifying currency and laws, Europe still consists of many diverse cultures, has a huge 
variety of insolvency systems, and a host of diverging philosophies about debt.228
As a rule, financial failure on the continent carries significantly more stigma than in the 
common law countries, and the personal bankruptcy laws are less forgiving than those in 
the common law countries.229  Reorganization laws are far more varied and reflect other 
societal concerns.230 European governments are attempting to reduce the negative stigma 
associated with business failure in order to fuel entrepreneurial spirit.231  Many countries, 
as well as lawmakers of the newly formed European Union, are looking to the U.S. for 
ideas.232
1. Continental Credit Use and Personal Bankruptcy Systems
Personal bankruptcy systems on the continent vary significantly, but have become 
far more forgiving in the past decade, following the deregulation of consumer credit.  
While credit, particularly consumer credit, is on the rise on the continent, it is still light 
years behind that in the U.S. and England.233 Savings rates on the continent are declining 
as well.234 Socially-minded European governments have expressed concern over both the 
increase in credit use and the reduction in savings rates.235  As a result, some have simply 
225
 The U.S. did away with the word “bankrupt” in the 1978 Code, replacing it with the more genteel 
“debtor,” exactly because “bankrupt” carried such negative stigma.  See 11 U.S.C. § 101.  This was done to 
attempt to stop citizens from being prejudiced toward bankruptcy debtors.
226
227
 Steven Pearson, Successful Restructuring Requires Sensitivity, THE FINANCIAL NEWS, December 1, 
2002, 2002 WL 24141004. 
228 See infra notes 233-311 and accompanying text.
229
 Martin, supra note 175, at 408.
230 See infra notes 262-302 and accompanying text.
231
 Paul Mizen, (paper published by the Experian Cenrtre for Economic Modeling, School of Economics, 
University of Nottingham), at  http://nottingham.ac.uk/eco, visited on March 3, 2004. European Credit 
Research Institute, ECRI Research Report Number 1, Consumer Credit in the European Union, at 16-18, 
hppt://www.ecri.be/pubs/ECRIen, visited on March 2, 2004.
232
 Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 153.
233 See Mizen, supra note 231, at 16.
234 See id.  France’s savings rate increased a bit to 15.6%, while all other countries’ rates dropped, and with 
one country, Denmark, dropping even to U.S. levels.  See id at 2. 
235
 Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Consumer Debt, hosted by National Social Service 
Board )(NSSB) Ireland and European Consumer DebtNet (CDN) Dublin, Ireland, Sept., 1998, Consumer 
Debt Problems In Changing Europe, at 9, http://news.bbcco.uk/2/hi/business, visited on February 24, 2003.  
In the Keynote Conference Speech, Minister of Social, Community and Family Affairs, Dermot Ahern, 
stated that:
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stepped up efforts to educate the public about the hazards of credit use.236 Others have 
liberalized bankruptcy and discharge laws, in order to ensure that social problems aren’t 
exacerbated by the increases in credit.237
Not all European countries have forgiving bankruptcy systems, however, and 
some have no systems for consumers at all. 238  For example, in the bankruptcy-restrictive 
countries of Italy, France239 and Greece,240 individuals are not eligible for bankruptcy 
protection unless they are engaged in business.241 In other words, there simply is no 
Here in Ireland, with our booming economy, and our young, vibrant population, the conditions are 
ripe for an expansion of consumerism, in addition to the already ‘normal’ levels of personal 
borrowing that exist in the population.  This, in point of fact, is not an undesirable prospect as 
consumer demand has, and will continue to, drive economic and employment growth.  It will 
underpin employment in the service sector and allow large sections of the population to expand 
and develop their lifestyles.
However, with all this emphasis on the booming economy, we must remember that the economy is 
just a means to an end and not an end in itself.  What really matters is the welfare of our people. 
Here we must ensure that massive growth in consumer credit does not lead to an equal growth in 
consumer debt.  People who are living on the margins of poverty must not be the ones to pay for 
our consumer boom.
As crises on a global scale are beyond our capacity to resolve, we have to concentrate our energies 
on national, local, and personal debt management strategies.
Id. at 9.
236 Id. at 35.  The Swedish keynote speaker at the same conference noted that as family debt increases it is 
imperative to educate children about debt. See id. at 35 (remarks of Hans Naslund).  As the speaker 
explained: [b]y strengthening children and young people in their role as consumers, the basis can be laid for 
a strong consumer role in adult life with lifestyles that are in harmony with their income.”  Id.  This 
certainly differs from the American model of the “strong consumer.”  See supra notes 104-45 and 
accompanying text. 
237 See Efrat, supra note 16, at 165-66. Professor Efrat hypothesizes that the need for a fresh start policy is 
greater in societies where the government does not regulate credit rates or availability, where the 
government actively promotes entrepreneurship, where the welfare programs are small, and where private 
financial institutions have relatively lax standards for granting credit.  See id.  He argues that the U.S. fresh 
start policy is very justified in this context, and also that more countries should enact more lenient systems 
of debt forgiveness as they move toward the U.S. regarding these factors.  See id. at 167-68.
238 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 109 n. 16. Under one scholar’s characterization of Continental systems, the 
most restrictive or “conservative” camp is comprised of systems that provide no debt forgiveness to 
consumers at all.  The “moderate” camp is comprised of nations that offer debt forgiveness to financially 
distressed consumers, but not as a matter of course, and the least restrictive or “liberal” camp, headed by 
the United States, consists of countries that provide a relatively prompt bankruptcy discharge as a matter of 
course. See id. at 82-83.
239
 Oddly, under French law, which is fairly liberal for business debtors, individuals can be discharged only 
from mortgage deficiency claims. See Efrat, supra note 3, at 86 (quoting Francoise Domont-Naert, Legal 
Response to Problems of Consumer Indebtedness in Europe, in CONSUMER LAW IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 285, 288 (Iain Ramsay ed., 1997)).  
Conceptually, I have always considered France to fall into the  most “conservative “ or ‘restrictive” group 
because there is no personal bankruptcy discharge at all, except for mortgage deficiency debt (emphasis 
added)  See id.
240
 Remarkably, the Greeks use little credit.  Greek households are not Overdebted, ATHENS NEWS, March 
13, 2003, 2003 WL 2677459.
241 See id. at 81; see also Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 154 (1993); Richard L. Bohanon & William 
C. Plouffe, Jr., Mongolian Bankruptcy Law: A Comparative Analysis with the American Bankruptcy 
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bankruptcy system for consumers. 242  Even for individuals engaged in business, a 
discharge is not granted until many years after bankruptcy is declared, and in a handful of 
the most restrictive places, no discharge is granted unless creditors are ultimately paid in 
full.243  This is certainly an unusual interpretation of a discharge, at least from an 
American perspective.244 The underlying theme of bankruptcy in these jurisdictions is 
that bankruptcy is a creditor-oriented mechanism and is not designed to serve the 
interests of financially distressed consumers.245
The lack of such a system could have grave societal implications in the face of 
consumer credit deregulation. In the past, countries without a personal bankruptcy system 
generally did not have access to consumer credit.  This equilibrium is now out of balance. 
Where there is an economy with consumer credit, such as in Italy or France, there is 
simply no way out.246  If one gets in trouble with consumer debt, one remains in trouble, 
perhaps indefinitely.  
Other European countries are more forgiving, providing some form of discharge.  
In Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Germany, France, Spain and Portugal,247
the judge has the discretion to decide whether a discharge is justified.248  While the 
particular standard for granting a discharge varies from place to place, the burden is on 
the debtor to prove that the discharge is justified in moderate camp jurisdictions.249 In 
System, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 6 (1999); Kevin P. Block, Ukranian Bankruptcy Law, 20 LOY. 
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 97, 99 (1997)
242
 In a few of these places, such as Brazil and Venezuela, an individual is only eligible for bankruptcy if he 
or she engaged in business activity as a merchant In many of these places there also is little consumer debt 
available.  Perhaps these laws make sense in their context. See Antonio Mendes, The New Latin American 
Debt Regime-A Brief Incursion into Bankruptcy and the Enforcement of Creditor's Rights in Brazil, 16 J. 
INT'L L. BUS. 107, 108 (1995). See Efrat, supra note 3, at 84. In the Czech Republic, the debtor must enter 
into a settlement agreement with her creditors. See Helmut Gerlach, Bankruptcy in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland and Section 304 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, Proceedings Ancillary to 
Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 81 (1998). Conversely, Chile and Egypt 
offer the debtor no discharge at the conclusion of the proceedings. See also Ricardo Sandoval, Chilean 
Legislation and Cross- Border Insolvency, 33 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 557, 577 (1998).
243 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 84-85. Professor Efrat notes that in these conservative nations, bankruptcy is a 
creditor-biased mechanism, more akin to a debt-collection proceeding that a debt-forgiveness framework. 
Thus, there is no need to discharge the debt.  See id.  In Italy, for example, discharge is for merchants only 
and it takes 5 years to get a discharge, while it takes 10 years in Greece.  See also Bankruptcy and a Fresh
Start:  Stigma on Failure and Legal Consequences of Bankruptcy, supra note 143, at 335.
244
 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code of 1978 allows certain debts to be wholly or partially discharged. 
245 See id. For example, one source claims that the purpose of Italian bankruptcy law is to “satisfy the 
creditors rights and remove the insolvency (sic) company from the market.”  See web page of Avvocato 
Giorgio Cherbuni, Giorgio.cherbuni@stdiopirola.com, visited on March 17, 2003. 
246
 Efrat, supra note 3, at 86.
247 See id. at 85. This category also includes the Asian countries of India, Pakistan, Japan, Singapore, and 
the Philippines, as well as Israel South Africa, Kenya and Uganda..  See id.
248 See id. at 87. This attribute has fundamental impact on debtors seeking relief, as they have the burden of 
convincing the judge to grant relief. Efrat reports that there are three basic reasons why debtors in this strata 
choose not to file for bankruptcy: social stigma, ignorance of debt forgiveness outcome, and the high costs 
and unpredictable results associated with convincing a judge.  This is an attribute of Indian law as well as 
the law of the Philippines, Singapore and Japan, and the African nations listed above. See id.
249 See id.
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many places, the judge may grant a bankruptcy discharge only if the person is unable to 
pay the debts.250  For example, in Denmark, the debtor must be hopelessly indebted and 
the circumstances must justify granting a discharge.251 In Norway, a debtor must be 
permanently unable to pay.252 In Sweden, in order to get a full or partial discharge, the 
debtor must affirmatively prove that “the debtor has no hopes of paying his or her debts 
in the foreseeable future.”253
Other European laws have other themes. In Austria and Germany, a discharge is 
only granted if the debtor abides by a repayment plan over a period of years, similar in 
some respects to Chapter 13 under American law.254 In Germany, the debtor must make 
an effort to increase his or her income for the benefit of creditors and also must pay over 
all seizable income to creditors for seven years.255 Moreover, creditors are only kept at 
bay so long as the debtor does not exceed a certain income or asset level,256 a provision 
that arguably creates the wrong incentives.
In all the systems discussed in this section, there has been movement toward 
liberalizing the laws, though none are as forgiving as that of the U.S., England and the 
other common law systems.257  Until recently, it was not clear that the continent needed 
forgiving bankruptcy systems, given extensive social systems and fairly rigid 
requirements for borrowing.258  Extensive growth in consumer credit, makes such debt 
forgiveness necessary, however, particularly in light of existing stigma about financial 
failure.259 Fortunately, as a whole European governments seem interested in making 
sound public policy and protecting citizens not merely fueling economies for their own 
sake.260 Hopefully these concerns will keep credit from proliferating beyond the 
respective systems’ ability to address failure in a constructive way.  Some countries, such 
as Italy and France, have not yet balanced these concerns and may face social problems 
as a result. 261
2. European Reorganization Schemes:  France and Germany as Examples.
250 See id. at 86. 
251 See id. at 103. See also Hans Petter Graver, Consumer Bankruptcy: A Right or a Privilege? The Role of 
the Courts in Establishing Moral Standards of Economic Conduct, 20 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 161, 170 
(1997).
252 See id.
253 See id. See also IIAN RAMSEY, CONSUMER LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:  NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 287 (1997) 
254 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 109. See also Christoph G. Paulus, The New German Insolvency Code, 33 
TEX. INT’L L. J. 141, 143-44 (1998)
255 See id. ("The Gesamtvollstreckungsordnung includes a discharge rule--not the Anglo-American rule but 
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As with personal bankruptcy systems, not all continental countries have 
reorganization schemes.  In fact, until recently, most countries did not have such a 
scheme.262  With the fall of communism and Europe’s desire to create a more competitive 
market economy, however, reorganization laws have become popular new legislation. 
Most of these systems are still very different from the U.S. Chapter 11 model.263  In most 
places, there is no “automatic stay” that protects the debtor and its assets upon the 
filing.264 Additionally, in most places the debtor must be insolvent in order to apply for 
reorganization and also must have some likely chance of success at reorganizing.265  The 
stay, if there is one at all, normally kicks in after the court sorts out all these problems 
and issues an order declaring the company in bankruptcy or reorganization.266
Under most schemes, the debtor’s management is replaced with the trustee, a 
neutral third party who will run the company while it is attempting to restructure, and 
who will control the case and the plan proposal process.267  In some reorganization 
schemes, secured creditors are not precluded or stayed from gaining possession of their 
collateral, and thus can thwart the reorganization process if they wish.268 For example, in 
the new European Union Counsel Regulation of Insolvency Proceedings, the secured 
party retains the right to dispose of assets and obtain satisfaction from the proceeds of 
262 See Martin, supra note 167, at 78.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265
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266 See id. at 82.
267 See, e.g, supra notes 282-315 and infra notes 408-36 and accompanying text.
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 Because of this, some scholars consider these composition systems rather than reorganization systems.  
Two economists recently completed a study of bankruptcy and insolvency laws and infrastructures around 
the world. Clas Wihlborg & Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Infrastructure Requirements in the Area of 
Bankruptcy Law, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 281, 281 (2001) (hereafter, “WSG”).  
Positing that strong creditor remedies, as well as strong rehabilitation systems, should save more firms, 
they compared countries on several considerations, starting with whether a county’s laws could be 
considered more debtor friendly or more creditor friendly. See id. at 291. Their study actually purports to 
be much broader, studying the economic role of insolvency procedures and their affect on efficient 
allocation of resources, economic growth, and the depth and duration of financial strain.  See id. at 284. 
They defined a creditor orientation as one that recognizes the claims of creditors to a great extent in 
insolvency (see id. at 295), and a debtor orientation as one that allows debtors to retain a stake or control in 
insolvency, (see id. at 293), although no equity is left in the firm. See id. at 291.  They also rated each 
country or region’s attitudes toward security, particularly floating liens that create a security interest in all 
cash flow generated by a business, and examined the scope of security interests under various countries’ 
laws. See id. at 294-95.  They argued that countries that allow floating liens or charges and that position the 
secured creditor’s interests over unsecured claims of labor and the government, for example, should create 
more certainty for lenders and thus promote lending and growth. See id. at 295, 307.  The authors note that 
in Latin America, labor claimants are highly favored, which could explain why there is little lending in 
Latin America.  On the other hand, the authors acknowledge that the same favoritism toward labor is 
present in France, see id. at 301, but there is no dearth of lending there.
Countries found to be very sympathetic to creditor interests in these ways were all the English 
common-law countries, including the United States, and Scandinavia. See id. at 296-97.  Sympathetic 
countries include Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Scotland and South Africa.  Countries hostile 
to security on these factors include Belgium, Luxemburg, Greece, Spain, and most of Latin America, See 
id. at 300.
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those assets.269   In some countries, labor claims are so strong that they also are not stayed 
and can also veto any plan the debtor proposes. 270
Many schemes, like the U.S. scheme, provide that creditors can vote on the plan 
of reorganization and thus decide if it should be allowed to reorganize or should instead 
be liquidated.271  Many, though not all, countries’ laws also allow the majority to bind the 
dissenting minority to the terms of the plan.272 In some places, big institutional creditors, 
such as lenders and banks, control the case and essentially decide the business’s fate.273
In most places, secured creditor claims are not changed in either amount or payment 
terms, causing one scholar to conclude that these are not really Chapter 11-style 
reorganization scheme but rather “composition” plans.274
Compared to American bankruptcy laws, many countries’ laws read like penal 
codes.  Fraud and criminal activities are discussed at length, leaving one to believe that 
there is almost a presumption of criminal activity or fraud when a business fails to pay its 
debts.275 Other provisions suggest that limited liability is not as “limited” as it is in the 
United States; thus more debts pass through to parents, owners and even mangers.276
Finally, in some countries, if the managers let the company run for longer than is 
reasonable without seeking rehabilitation assistance or closing down, the mangers can be
imprisoned for wasting creditors’ assets.277
French reorganization law, at one end of the continuum, is considered the most 
“rescue” oriented in the world, even more so than Chapter 11 of the U.S. Code.278  The 
goal of the French system is not merely to facilitate reorganization, but to encourage it, 
through early interventionist mechanisms that force or strongly encourage businesses to 
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278 See WSG supra note 268, at 293. Part of the reason it is considered more debtor friendly than American 
law is because of the very strong rights of secured creditors under U.S. law, which are balanced by Chapter 
11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcies.  Secured creditors do not have these strong rights in France.  Id. at 296.  In 
fact French bankruptcy laws could be considered hostile.
These laws are far different from those of Germany.  See Paulus, supra note 254, at 145.  In May 
of 2000, the European Union adopted the European Union Counsel regulation of Insolvency Proceedings 
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between member nations.278 The task proved daunting because France had a strong rehabilitation goal and 
culture, whereas Germany favored liquidation over rehabilitation and gave secured creditors the right to 
control business bankruptcy cases. 
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seek rehabilitation early enough so businesses and jobs are not lost.279 France has a strong 
history of state intervention into corporate affairs, which has carried over into modern 
reorganization laws.280  The process favors saving job-generating enterprises at almost 
any cost.281
German reorganization law, lies at the other end of the spectrum in some respects.  
It now allows for but certainly does not favor the use of a debtor-in-possession. In 1999, 
Germany enacted “rescue” legislation, with the stated purpose of promoting 
reorganization over liquidation.282  Prior to this time, the only insolvency law used in 
Germany was a liquidation statute, the Konkursordnung.283  While another prior law, the 
Vergleichsordnung, allowed rehabilitation,284 the concept of reorganizing rather than 
liquidating a troubled business had never really been accepted in German culture and thus 
the Vergleichsordnung was never used.285  Thus, prior to the adoption of the New 
German Insolvency Code (the “InsO”), all businesses were simply liquidated.286  The 
presumption in favor of liquidation was so strong that when a team of researchers 
279 See Richard L. Koral & Marie-Christine Sordino, The New Bankruptcy Reorganization Law in France:  
Ten Years Later, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 437, 437-40 (1996).  The laws require greater financial reporting so 
that companies in distress are identified early, and the companies themselves recognize when they are in 
need of assistance. All financial reports are filed with the clerk of the Commerce Tribunal who, using 
computer programs designed to identify signs of weakness in a company, brings defaults to the attention of 
the president of the Commercial Tribunal. If the company does not address the defaults the president of the 
Commerce Tribunal has the power to call the company’s President into chambers for a “frank personal 
discussion”. I can imagine that companies would prefer to avoid this discussion. Courts in the United States 
do not have the oversight ability given to the courts in France, and hence no early intervention.  See id. at 
457.  The court can also arrange for mediation between the company and its creditors before judicial 
remedies are needed. Id at 446.
280 Id. at 444. France has historically protected the rights of workers, which explains the involvement of the 
court in reorganization plans. Dating back to 1673 with the “Ordinance de Colbert” and the original 
Commercial Code of 1807, France has had an attraction for state intervention. The courts play a role much 
more inclined to protect the economic function of society,  rather than a means for creditors to regain their 
debt.
281 See id. 
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debtors.” Insolvenzordnung [Insolvency Act], v. 5.10.1994 (BGB1. I S.2866)( hereinafter, the “ InsO”), 
Section 1; see also Christoph Paulus, Germany:  Lessons to Learn from the Implementation of a New 
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Before we get too excited about this significant change, we should recognize that this does not 
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[a]t the report meeting the insolvency administrator shall report on the economic situation of the debtor and 
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over the long haul seems outside the contemplation of this new law.
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collected data on the effectiveness of rehabilitation systems around the world, no 
rehabilitation statistics were available for Germany.287
German lawmakers, if not German society in general, now believe that liquidation 
is not the best solution to some industry or business problems.288  The enactment of the 
InsO was motivated by recessions and general problems with the economy, as well as the 
need to help acclimate and protect Eastern European individuals and businesses, who 
have been “overwhelmed by Western consumer standards.” 289 Unlike most parts of the 
world, German insolvency cases are presided over by a specialized bankruptcy court.290
In most cases brought under the InsO, a trustee, called an administrator, operates the 
debtor’s business, although at least in theory, a debtor-in-possession is possible.291
Reality may operate quite differently, however.  Whatever the new Code actually 
says about the plan’s possible affect on creditors, creditors - particularly secured creditors 
- always have and still do control insolvency proceedings.292  In fact, although the new 
Code states that the administrator appointed in each case shall be independent and thus 
not biased toward any particular party in the case, prior to the enactment of InsO,293 it 
was common for the administrator to be chosen by the lead or primary secured lender in 
the case.294  This has not changed under the InsO.295  Thus, despite the technical 
requirement of an independent administrator, the main or lead bank can often choose an 
administrator who is friendly to its interests.
Additionally, despite clear language in the InsO stating that one purpose of the 
InsO is to “reorganize insolvent debtors,” this concept is far from universally accepted.  
One scholar wrote after the enactment of the InsO that German insolvency law does not 
287 See WSG, supra note 268, at 302.
288 See InsO, Section 1.
289 See Paulus, supra note 254, at 142. Professor Paulus explains in another article that “once the wall 
came down, an enormous and politically significant number of East German households had become 
insolvent- to a high degree due to common Western sales practices to which former GDR inhabitants had 
never been exposed before.  Thus, the German legislature was bound to do something for the needs of these 
families.”  Paulus, supra note 282, at 90.
290 See View from the Bench, supra note 6, at 518-19. In fact, many of the important decisions made by the 
German Bankruptcy courts are actually delegated to a graduated law clerk who is paid less and presumably 
has far less experience that the judges themselves.  See id. at 533-34.
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favor rehabilitation over liquidation, and leaves that decision squarely in the hands of 
creditors.296   Even the explicitly provided for “reorganization” contemplated by the InsO 
is not what an American lawyer might picture; this is not a reorganization in which the 
business restructures its debts and continues in operation over the long haul.  Section 157 
of the InsO states that “[a]t the report meeting the creditors’ assembly shall decide 
whether the debtor’s enterprise should be closed down or temporarily  continued.”297
Thus, a reorganization that leaves a debtor operational on a long-term basis appears 
outside the contemplation of this new law.
Finally, the debtor-in-possession provisions in the InsO are also likely to get little 
play.  The concept of a debtor-in-possession has been criticized and mistrusted by most 
of German society for such a long time that it may never be unearthed regardless of what 
the law says.298  Professor Paulus tells an amazing story about the Holzman Construction 
Company bankruptcy, in which Holzman had the most experienced and well thought-of 
insolvency attorney appointed to the board of the company, so that they could go forward 
under the best of circumstances with the very first debtor-in possession case under the 
new law. 299 The government was so opposed to the concept of a debtor-in possession 
that they found a way to bail Holzman out completely so that there would be no 
bankruptcy and thus no debtor-in-possession.300
Again, history and culture may be more important in determining how cases are 
handled than the actual law. As one scholar notes, people who were accustomed to the 
old law are likely to stick to what they have become accustomed to, and act as they 
always have, regardless of which law is on the books.301  Thus, two years after the InsO 
went into effect, the new law is still widely objected to, if not entirely ignored.302
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3. Conclusions About European Bankruptcy Laws and Culture
While one might predict that personal bankruptcy would carry more stigma than 
business bankruptcy in most of continental Europe, particularly since some countries do 
not permit a discharge for people who are just consumers, the line between individual 
financial failures and business ones is blurred on the continent.  Failure is failure pure and 
simple and the stigma is significant.303
Until recently, there was little consumer credit, and thus little need for a consumer 
bankruptcy system.  This is all about to change as consumer credit becomes widely 
available to a huge percentage of the population over the next decade. This could leave 
many societies with excessive debt and no way to discharge it. Even if discharge systems 
are enacted, societal views about debt may keep them from being used. In many failed 
businesses throughout Europe, including The U.K., the stigma is so pronounced that 
executives and even employees and suppliers often disappear entirely.304
On the business side, European governments are already doing all that they can to 
enact rescue-style reorganization systems, in order to allow more failing businesses to 
survive in troubled times.305 As an official European Union source stated:
Europe must re-examine its attitudes toward risk, reward and failure.  Thus, 
enterprise policy must encourage policy initiatives that reward those who take 
risks.  Europe is often reluctant to give a second chance to those entrepreneurs 
who failed.  Enterprise policy will examine the conditions under which failure 
303
 When Ioncia P.L.C., a wireless telephone company, failed recently in the Netherlands , all employees 
lost their jobs, stockholders lost their equity and suppliers found new work or failed themselves.  Five 
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could acquire a less negative connotation and it could be acceptable to try again.  
It will encourage member states to review bankruptcy legislation to encourage 
risk-taking.306
A recent European Union (“EU”) study examined stigma and financial failure in the 
fifteen EU member states as well as the United States to determine how to reduce stigma 
about financial failure, for the benefit of the overall EU economy.307   Given the extent of 
the negative stigma, the study concluded that even if domestic legislators adopt laws that 
promote a fresh start, “there is a need to introduce a European cultural campaign 
promoting the fresh start….”308
Yet Europeans appear conflicted on whether to actually promote a fresh start. 
This study, as well as numerous other sources, focuses extensively on separating the 
fraudulent from the non-fraudulent debtors, and providing rehabilitation rights only for 
the worthy.309 There is no indication, however, that fraud will be a problem.310  While the 
goals of the E.U. in modernizing and liberalizing the insolvency laws of member 
countries seem sensible, it is unclear whether this will work.  Long- held and strong 
cultural values may stand in the way, despite the best intentions of lawmakers.  This has 
clearly been an impediment in Germany where rescue culture has not been accepted in 
society.  In France, by comparison, where rescue culture is entirely consistent with long-
held beliefs about the importance of saving jobs, rescue culture and business 
reorganization has been well accepted and frequently utilized.311
E. East Asian Bankruptcy Law and Culture:  A Different World
306 See id.
307 See id.  According to this study, most EU member states have legal procedures aimed at rehabilitation, 
but they appear to be unsuccessful or unpopular with the business community, due to negative complex and 
expensive procedures, a lack of awareness of the options, as well as slow adaptation to new systems.  See 
id. at 356. 
308 See id. at 354. The study went on to say that “[i]n Latin countries, the word “faillite” (“fallimento”, 
“quiebra”…) holds a very negative connotation.   It seems that these cultural elements would also require a 
sound reflection in order to involve these three communities.”  
309 See id. at 356;see also Bethany Blow, The Economics of Insolvency, Conference Summary, .Financial 
Stabilitt report, 153, 154 (Dec. 2002), available at http/:www.bankofengland.co.uk/conferences/conf0209, 
visited on March 17, 2003 (reciting the remarks of Paolo di Martino, an Italian attorney, stating that 
bankruptcy law must “be able to select between good and fraudulent debtors”). 
310
 The implication is that fraud in bankruptcy is a major issue, although there is no reason to believe that 
this is the case. Given the extremely small number of fraudulent debtors that are present even in the lenient 
U.S, system, this goal seems oddly misplaced.  It continues to focus on the negative rather than promoting 
forgiveness and future economic activity. These goals seem particularly misplaced when compared to 
American metaphors about the fresh start. For example in the famous case of Local Loan v. Hunt, the U.S. 
Supreme Court described the Bankruptcy Act as:  “a sturdy bridge over financially troubled waters….We 
refuse to make it a treacherous tightrope on which the slightest misstep spells disaster and over which only 
the most accomplished acrobat can successfully pass.”  292 U.S. 234, 238 (1934). Commentators playing 
on Hunt’s metaphors have claimed that bankruptcy provides “the opportunity to free a family from living 
hell, permitting it to attain a new and brighter world, no longer oppressed by the clouds of fear, 
degradation, and discouragement…” Papke, supra note 70, at 212.
311 See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
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Of all of the East Asian countries, Japan has borrowed the most from American 
bankruptcy systems and also has developed the most complex bankruptcy systems.312  Its 
systems are thus discussed below in some detail.  To a large extent, Japan’s attempted 
transplantations have failed to overcome strong cultural attitudes against bankruptcy.313
Hong Kong is less traditional and could probably accept modern bankruptcy laws much 
more readily.314  Ironically, it has not modernized its business bankruptcy laws, due to its 
own unique cultural concerns.315  China’s proposed bankruptcy laws also borrow 
significantly from American systems.316  These laws are far more lenient about business 
failure than existing Chinese laws.317 Given China’s traditionally communist economy, it 
faces unique challenges as it attempts to adopt bankruptcy laws that will promote a 
market-based economy.318  Given strong cultural beliefs that bankruptcy is bad luck and 
will follow a family forever,319 China may face problems similar to those of Japan in 
gaining acceptance of more lenient bankruptcy laws.   
1. Japanese Bankruptcy Law and Culture.
In the past few years, Japanese spending habits, as well as Japanese bankruptcy 
and insolvency laws, have gradually become more similar to their U.S. counterparts.320
Drastic measures have been taken to promote business rehabilitation in order to aid 
Japan’s ailing economy.321 Personal bankruptcy has also become more accessible.322
These are necessary developments, given that credit has recently become more available 
to the Japanese, which has in turn increased borrowing.323 Yet the Japanese avoid using 
these initiatives for cultural reasons.324
A. Law and Japanese Culture
Western legal notions are unfamiliar to the Japanese mind, heart, and soul.  
Traditional Japanese culture emphasizes the group over the individual, similarity over 
difference.325  Thus, the Japanese feel that it is embarrassing and shameful to need to 
312 See infra notes 375-411 and accompanying text.
313 See infra notes 412-18 and accompanying text.
314 See infra notes 458-61 and accompanying text.
315 See infra notes 423-38 and accompanying text.
316 See infra notes 498-507 and accompanying text.
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resort to the law.326   In fact, the Japanese believe that everyone would be better off if 
there was no law, and no need for the law.327  Naturally, then, use of the court system is 
viewed as a last resort. Informal mediation and negotiation is encouraged and used 
primarily for dispute resolution. 328  If these tactics fail and formal proceedings are 
necessary, it is assumed that both parties will neither win nor lose.329  The objective of 
the court system is not to declare a winner or loser, but rather to construct a harmonious 
compromise for both parties.330
Japanese culture has often been referred to as a culture of shame.331  This 
characterization encompasses everything from the adverse attitude toward the need for 
laws to suicide over debts and economic failure.332  In the 1990’s, a new element was 
added into the mix of Japanese culture.  The government and aristocracy began a 
campaign of kokusaika, meaning the internationalization of Japanese style and culture.333
This trend introduced more foreign influences into Japan than ever before.334  Yet cultural 
trends of other countries are never fully integrated into the cultural fabric of Japan.335
Instead, they maintain their “foreignness” and are even thought of as elite, exotic and 
cosmopolitan.336
With the modern trend of globalizing culture and business, Japan began in early 
2001 to reform its bankruptcy laws. In the past, bankruptcy proceedings in Japan have 
taken place only after an extensive and informal process of confidential discussions with 
the court as to reorganization without insolvency.337  This included informal contact with 
creditors.338  The emphasis of these informal discussions was on rescue, not through any 
“formal legal process . . .[or] the application of an insolvency law.”339  Unfortunately for 
the individual or individuals at the head of a financially troubled business, the culture of 
shame that pervades Japan makes bankruptcy a personal failure, not a business failure.340
This characterization of bankruptcy in Japan often leads to tragedy for the individual, be 
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it suicide or isolation from family and community.341  Bankruptcy is a type of devastation 
not unlike “sickness, shipwrecks, fires, painful childbirth, and other vicissitudes.”342
The reluctance of the Japanese to use the new formal insolvency law and their 
propensity for the more informal discussion is firmly rooted in the negative Japanese 
attitude towards law.343 As law and ethics are inseparable to the Japanese, a contract 
breach or a formal bankruptcy proceeding are as personal as character flaws.344  Rather 
than a legal system of rights and duties, the Japanese follow the concept of giri345.  Giri is 
loosely translated to mean “a duty or the state of a person who is bound to behave in a 
prescribed way toward a certain other person.” 346  Obligation of fulfillment of giri is not 
legally enforced, but socially and culturally enforced as part of personal honor.347  Again, 
the idea of shame or guilt attached to behaving in a way that is contrary to giri builds the 
foundation of law and society in Japan.348  The well-known Japanese notion of “losing or 
saving face” also flows from the concept of giri.349  Following giri is thought to be 
intuitive, not learned, and therefore formal rules of law are resisted by the Japanese as 
counter-intuitive.350  Lawyers themselves appear to play a different role in Japan than in 
the West, as the word lawyer in Japanese, bengoshi, translates loosely as mediator rather 
than litigator.351 The law itself is analogized to a sacred sword – it is displayed but 
preferably never used.352
B.  Japan’s Economy and Spending Habits
While some Americans stereotype the Japanese as profligate spenders,353 in 
reality the Japanese are among the biggest savers in the world.354   Japan’s economy, the 
341 Associated Press, Japanese Ponder Shame Culture that Leads to Suicides Over Debt,
http://www.charleston.net., visited on Feb. 7, 2004.
342 Omamori-Good Luck Charms, http://www.oren.jp, visited on Feb. 7, 2004. Perhaps while it is 
acceptable to the Japanese to transplant foreign popular cultural trends into their society, it is not, however, 
appropriate to transplant foreign systems of law into Japanese society.  The new Japanese bankruptcy laws 
are based on the UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) model law. 
Kazuhiko Yamamoto, New Japanese Legislation on Cross-border Insolvency as Compared with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law), 11 INT. INSOL. REV. 
67, 69 (2002). The traditional foundation of Japanese aversion to law and the omni-present culture of 
shame may prevent the new system of law from ever being used by the Japanese in a way that is 
comparable to other countries.  Id.
343
 Harmer, supra note 337, at 154.
344
  Noda, supra note 325, at 310.
345
 Ken Minami, Japanese Thought and Western Law: A Tangential View of the Japanese Bengoshi and the 
Japanese American Attorney, 8 LOYOLA L. S. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 301, 306-7 (1986), citing Y. NODA, 
INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 174 (1976).
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 314.
352 Id.
353See Arnold Redman and N.S. Gullet, An Empirical Study of the Impact of Foreign Ownership on the 
Values of U.S. Commercial Properties, 11 J. FIN. STRAT. DECS. 53, 53 (1998). 
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second largest in the world, began to fail in the early nineties because of overall business 
failure that in turn threatened the entire banking system.355 This was caused in large part 
because the Japanese traditionally prefer saving over spending and have refused to buy 
commensurate with Japan’s growing economy.356 The Japanese government begged 
citizens to spend money to fuel their crashing economy.357 Unlike Americans, who were 
too happy to oblige when asked to do the same after September 11, the Japanese refused. 
As a group, they are less willing to spend, particularly in tough economic times marked 
by industry failures and job loss.358
Like the American spending habits discussed previously, these habits were 
created through historical events.359  After World War II, Japan built its economy on 
standardized mass production.360 This was wildly successful, creating a large trade 
surplus with the United States, the world’s largest consumer, and creating a large middle 
class.361  Japan’s success in this area caused it to enter the stock or “value “ market very 
late, and probably to enter this area too quickly, without public understanding or support 
of the financial industries upon which the value market is based.362  This created a 
 This perception is likely the result of widespread Japanese real estate investments in the 1980’s. For 
instance, in 1985, Japanese investment in U.S. real estate was $1.8 billion. Within one year, this number 
climbed to $5.0 billion. By 1988, Japanese investment totaled $16.5 billion. See id.
354 See Mann, supra note 100, at 1084 n. 103 (noting that American household savings rates now hover 
between zero and one percent, but that the Japanese rates are around 13%).  Other sources suggest that 
Japan’s savings rate is now around 11.2%, lower but still among the highest in the world, along with France 
at 15.6% and Belgium at 13.9%.  See Paul Mizen, supra note 231.
355 Id.
356 Id.
357
 Wayne Angell, How to Save Japan from Over-saving, Wall St. J., June 20, 1998.
358 Q&A: Reviving the Japanese Economy, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/news_id_1229000/1229930.stm, visited on March 26, 2003. Banks even 
started lending at virtually no interest to try to get people to spend money and borrow money but to no 
avail.  This is just too foreign for the Japanese who like to buy with cash but only if they feel comfortable 
with the amount they have saved. Because the economy was so soft as it was this refusal to spend at all 
because of the failing firms made the economy screech to a halt. But see Mann, supra note 103, at 1086 
(noting that despite these unquestionably high savings rates, Japan does have a great deal of consumer debt 
in its economy).
359
 During the Tokagawa period (1603- 1868), feudal lords exploited tenant’s surpluses and left tenants 
with very low standards of living. See Shin-Ichi Yonekawa, Recent Writing on Japanese Economic and 
Social History, ECON. HIST. REV.107-23 (1985).  Japan also engaged in non-agricultural endeavors in this 
period, including rice marketing and financing, land transport, and coastal shipping.  Id, (quoting Shinbo, 
H. and Y. Yasuba.  Kindai Ikoki no Nippon Keizai (Japanese Economy in the Transition to Modern Times), 
1979. During the Meiji period that followed (1868-1912), Japan attempted to nurture a modern industrial 
economy.  This movement was drastically behind similar movements in the U.S. and Europe, however. It 
also had a different flavor, resulting from Marxist influences, that retained  militaristic influences on 
industry.  Although the resulting government-run businesses were not successful, this left valuable lessons 
for the more capitalist systems that followed. See Yonekawa, supra, at 122. 
360
 Speech given by Taichi Sakaiya at the American Enterprise Insitute, Washington D.C., March 29, 2001. 
Sakaiya was minister of state for economic planning from July, 1998 until December, 2000, as well as a 
former senior official of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. 
361 See Sakaiya, supra note 360. 
362 See id. Sakaiya also suggests that another reason for Japan’s deflationary period was caused by a 
reluctance to diversify from a purely mass-production economy to an information technology economy. As 
46
“bubble economy”363 which burst in the nineties, and the effects of which are still felt 
today.364  In  2001, Japan announced that it was in its first deflationary economy in 
history.365
This trend may be changing however, particularly in the area of credit card use.  
The Japanese currently carry much more cash than Americans and do not use credit cards 
nearly as extensively.366  Additionally, while about half of all Americans carry a balance 
on their credit cards, only about 10% of the Japanese do so. 367  This is in part because 
most Japanese cards are not set up for this type of use.  In most cases, the Japanese are 
required to decide at the checkout counter if they want to pay off the item in one billing 
cycle or carry the debt for a longer period.368 Recently, a new product was made available 
to the Japanese that did not require this up-front decision and disclosure, and thus 
allowed the customer to decide later if he or she wanted to pay off the item or carry it as a 
balance.369 This financial product has been very successful for the issuers because a 
shocking 90% of the items purchased on these cards have not been paid off in a cycle but 
instead carried as revolving credit. 370 At least one scholar predicts that the use of 
revolving credit is likely to increase drastically as a result of the availability of this 
product.371
Despite the past unwillingness of individuals to spend, Japanese businesses spent 
and borrowed extensively. Due to the lack of profits, and extremely lax banking
regulations and borrowing requirements, many businesses are failing. After a record 
companies like Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco Systems were developing new ways to store information and 
exchange data, Japanese businesses remained focused on producing consumer goods. 
363 See id. A clear example of a bubble economy comes from the dot.com mid-1990s, where the natural 
price of a company’s stock and the artificial selling price differed significantly. Thus, in this short time, a 
large spike or bubble would occur, until it ultimately burst based on the artificial valuations which had 
previously propped it up. Japan suffered from various bubbles. Its investors were buying up stocks at 
inflated prices not because they expected a solid dividend return but because they expected further gains in 
the value, not unlike the American investing public who funneled millions to companies who could never 
provide investors with dividends, but whose stock was valued based on speculation. What’s more, Japan’s 
real estate prices were so out of line that at one time the land beneath the Emperor's Palace in Tokyo was 
considered more valuable than all of California. Finally, Japan imposed a monetary policy that forced the 
rate of interest to deviate from a natural rate generated by the supply and demand for saving. Jennifer 
McNulty, http://www.ucsc.edu/oncampus/currents/97-10-13/hutchison.htm, visited on March 2, 2004.
364
 See McNulty, supra note 363. 
365 See id. Many businesses continue to fail because of this stagnant economy.  The most common reason 
for this continuing problem seems to be the public’s relentless unwillingness to spend.  Even at interest 
rates of less than one percent, the Japanese people do not want to borrow money. They continue to over-
save and under-spend  which stops growth and investment in private industry. See Angell, supra note 357. 
This has also caused the yen to fall as against the dollar as people prefer to save in the stable dollar, further 
exacerbating the problem. Id. 
366 See Mann, supra note 100, at 1056.
367
 See id. at 1057. 
368 See id. at 1074. Carrying a balance involves telling the sales clerk that the item will not be paid for 
immediately, a step many Japanese are unwilling to take for smaller purchase and even many larger 
purchases. See id. In reality, then, most Japanese credit cards have been used like an American debit card.
369
 See id. 
370 See id. at 1080.
371 See id. 
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number of corporate bankruptcies,372 in 1996, the government embraced rescue culture 
with a vengeance, starting a rapid initiative to revamp business reorganization laws to 
make it easier to reorganize and keep a company from folding.373 The government 
planned to unfold a new reorganization law for smaller businesses in 2001, but as the 
economy continued to flag, it stepped up efforts and actually finalized and passed the 
new reorganization law ahead of schedule.374
B. Personal Bankruptcy in Japan
As in many other parts of the world, bankruptcy was not initially available to 
individuals in Japan but only to merchants. 375 Eventually, a personal bankruptcy system 
was enacted, that could be used by any natural person, whether a merchant or not. 376
From the beginning, creditors in Japan had the right to decide whether to allow a 
merchant to stay in business or to liquidate his business.377 Today individuals are able to 
obtain a discharge fairly routinely, causing at least one scholar to conclude that Japanese 
personal bankruptcy law is not drastically different than in the U.S.378 In many ways, 
however, Japanese bankruptcy law is stricter than American law. A bankruptcy case can 
be maintained only if the debtor is unable to pay debts as they become due. 379 Moreover 
the discharge is not automatic but must be applied for. 380 In addition, it takes ten full 
372
 Angell, supra note 357.
373
  The theory of changing the law was that if these companies could pay back their debts, rather than just 
ceasing operations, this might save the failing banks and the entire system.
374 See infra notes 482-511 and accompanying text.
375
 Matthew Bender, Doing Business in Japan, 5-XIV-7-DBJAPAN § 7.01 (2001)(hereinafter “Doing 
Business in Japan”). The system that was in place was simply a private agreement (kashi bunsan) between 
the obligor and his creditors.  The obligor was a social outcast, and not worthy of the usual social 
considerations due to a member of society. Private agreements began in the 1600’s and continued until 
1867.  
376Doing Business in Japan, supra note 375, at. §7.02, (2001); Bankruptcy Act, Arts. 5, 12, 31, 33,34, 42-
44, 80-82.
377 Id.
378 See Mann, supra note 10o, at 1084-85.
379 See Doing Business in Japan, supra note 375, at §7.02.
379
  Japanese law focuses on the civil law approach of accentuating the debtor’s insolvency to justify 
bankruptcy proceedings. Currently Japanese law recognizes three bankruptcy causes: shiharai-funC
(Insolvency), shiharai-teishi (suspension of payments), and saimu-chCka (liabilities exceed assets). When 
the petition is filed with the clerk the court does not confirm that there is in fact a “cause” that would 
support the petition.  The obligor can rebut each type of “cause” if they do not want the bankruptcy 
adjudicated.  For a more in depth overview of how Japanese Bankruptcy law operates and treats 
adjudication of Bankruptcy status see Insolvency Overview-Japan: The World Bank, 
http://Gild%20G%20User:password@wbln0018.worldbank.org/legal/gild/Home/Japan.nsf/lates, last 
visited May 30, 2003; see also Shinchiro Abe, Recent Developments of Insolvency Laws and Cross-Border 
Practices in the United States and Japan, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 49-51 (2002). As in the United 
States, a trustee is appointed to take over all non-exempt assets.  Id. As in the United States, a trustee is 
appointed to take over all non-exempt assets.  See Civil Execution Act, (Minhi ShikkC HC, Law No. 4, 
1979), Arts. 131. 132. 152., 153., cited in Doing Business in Japan, supra note 375, at  § 7.06[1].  As in the 
United States, a trustee is appointed to take over all non-exempt assets.  Id.
380 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 102. It will be granted, in the judge’s discretion, only if the judge finds that 
the debtor is honest and unable to pay his or her debts. See id; see also Report on Bankruptcy Law and the 
Trend of Consumer Bankruptcy in Japan from Takashi Yoshida, Primus Financial Services, Japan, to 
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years to get the discharge, during which time the debtor is forbidden from many business 
activities, including being a director of a corporation or a kabushiki kaishi. 381
Personal bankruptcy is rare in Japan, with just .7 filings per 1,000 residents in 
2000, compared to 5.2 filings per 1,000 residents in the U.S.382 This is not surprising, 
given the spending habits of the Japanese,383 as well as the societal stigma assigned to 
such behavior.  The social implications arising out of the bunsan, or customary law of 
insolvency, are clear from the expression chawah hitotsu ni hashi ichizen, which literally 
means “one rice bowl and one pair of chopsticks.” 384  The phrase refers to the full 
exemptions to which a debtor was entitled under customary law,385 and suggests that a 
person who has filed for bankruptcy is entitled to virtually nothing, and is “a disgraced 
person no longer worthy of the usual social consideration due a member of society.”386
C. Japanese Reorganization Laws
Japan has a number of reorganization systems, and they are not mutually 
exclusive.387  This complex system includes the prior Composition Act,388 the Corporate 
Reorganization Act, 389 and the recently enacted Civil Rehabilitation Act (the “CRA”).390
Japan’s Commercial Code also provides for an out-of-court workout procedure known as 
a “Corporate Arrangement.”391 While the Corporate Reorganization Act was designed for 
large publicly traded companies, and while the Composition Act is roughly the 
predecessor for the new CRA for small business reorganizations,392 a company needn’t 
Elizabeth Bobenmoyer, FORD FINANCIAL 1, Nov. 27, 2001. Grounds for denial of a discharge include 
fraudulent conveyances prior to the case, making false statements to the court. See  CRA art. 366-69.
381 See Doing Business in Japan, supra note 375, at § 7.08 n. 14.
382
 Efrat, supra note 3, at 100.
383 See infra notes 353-74 and accompanying text.
384 See Doing Business in Japan, supra note 375, at §7.08.
385 See id.
386 See id.
387 See Shinichiro Abe, The Japanese Corporate Reorganization Reform Law of 2002, 22 AMER. BANKR. 
INST. J. 36, 36 (2003); Kent Anderson, Small Business Reorganizations:  An Examination of Japan’s Civil 
rehabilitation Act Considering U.S. Policy Implications and Foreign Creditors’ Practical Interests, 75 
AMER. BANKR. L.J. 355, 360 (2001).
388 See id. at n. 6, citing Wagi ho (the “Composition Act”). This was the reorganization law most often used 
before the recent enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Act, Law No. 225, Dec. 14, 1999 (the CRA”). For 
the statistical figures, see Anderson, supra note 387, at 360, citing  1 Saiko Saibansho Jimu Somukyoku 
[Supreme Court General Secretariat], SHIHO TOKEI NENPO, Minji hen (Annual Report of judicial 
statistics, Civil and administrative cases volume) (1990-1999).  
389 See Kaisha kosei ho (the “Corporate reorganization Act”).  The Corporate Reorganization Act has been 
described as a rigid and unforgiving process designed for the rehabilitation of large publicly-held 
corporations.  See Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11:  The Evidence 
From Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111,114 (1994).  
390 See Minji saisei ho (the “Civil Rehabilitation Act) (the “CRA”), Law No. 225, Dec. 14, 1999.
391 See Shinichiro, supra note 387, at 36.  This is essentially an out-of-court, private work-out arrangement. 
Because it requires the approval of all creditors to the proposed work-out plan, it has not been used much.  
Id.
392 See Anderson, supra note 387, at 360-61 (stating that the CRA is best seen as an extension or revision of 
the Composition Act).
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be large to use the Corporate Rehabilitation Act, nor small to use the CRA.393  In fact, 
Japan’s massive Sogo Department Store recently filed a case under the CRA, probably 
because it is simply more debtor friendly and easier to use than the Corporate 
Rehabilitation Act.394
Compared to both the Composition Act and the Corporate Reorganization Act, the 
CRA was a radical departure from existing law.395 It was the first debtor-in-possession 
system in Japan and was far less rigid than other existing systems.396  Unlike virtually all 
other schemes in existence at the time, outside the U.S.,397 the CRA does not contain an 
insolvency requirement.398  Like most other systems, a case will only be accepted if there 
is a chance of reorganization.399
In theory, the business is run by a debtor-in-possession under the CRA.400 The 
extent to which the company is actually run by a debtor-in-possession, however, varies 
from district to district.401   In the Osaka and Sapporo districts, courts usually follow an 
American-style reorganization scheme, leaving the debtor-in-possession in place and 
appointing no overseers.402  In Tokyo, however, the courts generally follow the old 
Composition system and appoint a supervisor in every case.403  In Nagoya, the courts 
seem to follow the English system and appoint examiners, including business 
393 See Anderson, supra note 387, at 363-64.
394
 See id. The Corporate Reorganization Act had yet to be modernized when the CRA was enacted, making 
the CRA as the most recent policy statement about business reorganization policy in Japan. 
395 See id.
396 See id Unlike the Composition Act, the CRA allows a business to file its petition for reorganization 
before a plan is submitted.  CRA, art. 21(2).
397
 France also has no insolvency requirement.  See Views from the Bench, supra note 6, at 560.
398 See CRA, art. 21.  Now a mere apprehension of either balance sheet or equitable insolvency is sufficient 
to allow one to file a successful petition.  See id .The reason for the change was that the drafters wanted to 
avoid an insolvency requirement that could make it too late to rehabilitate.  See Anderson, supra note 387, 
at 364. 
399 See CRA, art. 33, 21(1).  There must be a chance that the plan will actually be approved and a showing 
of good faith.  See id There is a time limit for filing a plan but it is not a rigid one.  See Anderson, supra
note 480, at 391.  Unlike the Composition Act, which requires a plan at filing, “the regulations 
accompanying the CRA provide that, unless special circumstances exist otherwise, a plan should be filed 
within two months of the deadline for submissions of proof of claim, that claims deadline generally being 
between two and four weeks after commencement. CRA art. 84, 18(1), (emphasis added). Furthermore, it 
is the court that determines the time frame for submitting a plan. “Debtor shall prepare and submit to the 
court a draft rehabilitation plan within the period stipulated by the court” see Anderson, supra note 387,  at 
391, citing  CRA, art. 163 (1).
400 The court, however, has the discretion to appoint a dizzying variety of professionals in a case, including 
supervisors, examiners, trustees, receivers, representative officers, and creditors’ committees.  See
Anderson, supra note 387, at 373-79 (describing the role of each of these professionals in detail).
401 See id. at 373. 
402 See id.
403 See id. The court can appoint a supervisor to monitor the debtor.  The statute is vague in terms of the 
powers of the supervisor, other then a supervisor will oversee the debtor and make sure the debtor does not 
do specific acts, as determined by the court, without the consent of the supervisor, CRA art. 54.  The 
supervisor has two affirmative powers: 1) the court can grant a supervisor a right of avoidance to challenge 
fraudulent and refilling transfers (CRA art. 56), and 2) the supervisor has a subpoena-like right to demand 
reports directly from the debtor and its officers and managers (CRA art. 59).
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professionals such as accountants to run the company in every case.404  Needless to say, 
there is still ambivalence in Japan about the concept of a debtor-in-possession, but this 
was a tremendous step toward embracing the debtor-in-possession concept.
Not long after the CRA was passed, the Corporate Reorganization Act was 
amended to make it more user-friendly as well.405  The most radical thing about the new 
Corporate Reorganization Act is that it binds both secured and unsecured creditors.406
Because of a strong belief in betsujo ken, or the right of separation for secured creditors, 
no prior Japanese bankruptcy or insolvency law ever affected the rights of secured 
parties.407  Even the new CRA does not affect the rights of secured creditors, 408 though it 
does allow debtors to reduce the debt owed on property by essentially paying its value 
into the court and thus wiping out the secured party’s security interest in that particular 
item.409
The passage of the CRA, as well as the recent amendments to the Corporate 
Reorganization Act, appear to be a successful attempt at liberalizing the laws in order to 
promote rehabilitation.  Having said that, one would assume that Japanese society now 
404 See id. The powers of the examiner is not as far reaching as the supervisor in that the examiner does not 
have the subpoena and avoidance powers.  However, the examiner is capable of examining the debtor (CRA 
at. 62).  The major duty of the examiner is to provide a report to the court in a stipulated time (CRA art. 
62).
405 See Shinichiro, supra note 387, at 36.  The amendments to the Corporate Reorganization Act went into 
effect on April 1, 2003.  Id.
406 Id.
407
 See CRA, art. 51; Tasuka Matsue, Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization, in Doing Business in 
Japan, supra note 375, at §§ 7.22 through 7.24 (Zentaro Kitagara rev.ed. 1999), cited in Anderson, supra
note 387, at 380. However, the CRA does provide that a court can temporarily limit a secured creditor’s 
right to sell a debtor’s property at judicial sale, if the debtor applies for such an order, pays the creditors 
potential costs up front, proves that the delay will not hurt the creditor, and also proves that the stay of such 
action is in the best interests of creditors.  CRA art. 31(1)(2). 
408The debtor has the burden of proving all of these things, unlike under Section 362 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, in which the debtor gets an automatic stay and the creditor must prove a host of facts in 
order to get the stay lifted.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)&(2). The narrowness of this exception demonstrates 
the powers of secured creditors in reorganization cases generally, including cases instituted under the CRA.
409
 CRA, art. 148(1). This  essentially amounts to a redemption under American bankruptcy law, see 11 
U.S.C. § 722, and is always permitted in a Chapter 11 as well as a Chapter 7.  Unfortunately, most 
American debtors, and, I suspect, Japanese debtors, do not have the cash to actually buy out the secured 
party’s interest in such collateral in most cases.  While this is not a drastic displacement of the secured 
party’s rights by American standards, and probably of little use to a cash-poor debtor, it is the first example 
in Japanese history of reducing a secured party’s claim in a bankruptcy case.  See Anderson, supra note 
480, at 384.  This provision could be useful in Japan’s current deflationary and stagnant economy, where 
many types of collateral have not held their value.  If nothing else, the provision may provide leverage - for 
the first time - against the secured party within a bankruptcy case.  See id.
The amendments to the Corporate Reorganization Act made the process far simpler overall than it 
once was. See Shinichiro, supra note 387, at 36 (stating that it was used between 4 and 57 times per year 
during the past 20 years).  The bankruptcy court need not find that a company has a prospect of 
reorganization under the new Corporate Reorganization, which is more favorable to debtors than the CRA, 
and which may facilitate earlier filings.  The Corporate Reorganization Act also gives better protection for 
post-petition claims, thus promoting post-petition financing. See id. at 37.  Finally, while the Corporate 
Reorganization Act is not a debtor-in-possession system per se, it does allow the court to appoint members 
of the debtor’s management as the trustee.
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accepts business failure as part of life in Japan. This does not appear to be the case. 
Bankruptcy of any kind is still a major embarrassment. The government has recently 
gone so far as to promote the use of the CRA in a prime-time television show describing 
its many positive uses and attributes,410 which itself demonstrates society’s resistance to 
this idea.
D.   When Law and Culture Clash:  Debt and Suicide.
At a time when the Japanese government is doing everything it can to reduce the 
stigma associated with financial failure, Japanese consumers finally appear to be 
loosening up and spending more. The use of revolving consumer credit appears to be on 
the rise, which may help fuel the economy. It also may result in more financial failure for 
consumers, which could actually cause more social problems. 
Despite more consumer credit in the system, the Japanese have not relaxed their 
views on financial failure, for either businesses or consumers. Despite the huge amount 
of debt companies have taken out recently, stigma over a failed business is higher in 
Japan than virtually anywhere else in the world. Executives of failed companies in Japan 
often do more than disappear.  Financial failure is the ultimate societal disgrace and 
suicide is a common way out.411  As higher consumer debt levels become more common, 
failures will increase and so may suicide rates.  It is unclear whether merely liberalizing 
laws can stem this tide.412
Japanese culture is complicated with many unspoken rules and hierarchies.413
People have the expectation of being in the same job for life and cannot face job lose 
without losing face.414  Yet saving face is the ultimate societal necessity.  Neither law nor 
410
 Anderson, supra note 387, at 363.  It is hard to imagine the U.S. government doing such a show to 
promote the use of Chapter 11, but the Japanese economy is in deep trouble. 
There also may be different cultural views on what makes for good advertising.  I remember a 
government campaign in Singapore, designed to stem the negative population growth in that country.  The 
government took out full-sized billboards all over town, proclaiming that “life without children is dull.”
411 See Francoise Kadri, Millions of Ordinary Japanese on Brink of Financial Ruin as Debts Mount,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, March 24, 2002, 2002 WL 2369590.  Suicide is tied directly to financial failure, 
and few people know that they can file for bankruptcy instead. See also Gautaman Bhaskaran, Suicide 
State, THE HINDU, May 12, 2002, 2002 WL 20190290.  There are scores of newspaper articles reporting on 
this problem, although this story is among the most poignant.  It ties the high suicide rates directly to the 
economic slump and outlines the government’s attempts to alleviate the problem through education.  The 
article reports on Japan’s well-known tradition of life-time employment and company loyalty, as well as 
the trend toward suicide when job loss occurs. Japan’s suicide rate is the highest in the industrial world, 
over 80 per day.  This source attributes a large portion of such deaths to financial problems, a phenomenon 
unknown to America society. See id.
412Stigma can be explained by looking at psychological literature, that claims that the more a society values 
independence, the less worried it is likely to be about contract breaches in general, and failures to pay 
specifically.  Cultures that highly value dependence over independence are more likely to want to keep 
ones word at all costs, as a way of saving face.  Davangshu Datta, Uncertain Times, THE BS WEEKEND,
October 26, 2002, 2002 WL 100052313.     
413
 Milhaupt, supra note 273, at 434-35.
414 See Curtis J. Milhaupt,  A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance:  Contract, Culture, 
and the Law, 37 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 3, 4 (1996).
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propaganda may be capable of changing these views.  In most parts of Asia, including 
Japan, informal agreements are as enforceable as formal ones, if not more so. 415  Explicit 
insolvency laws, like explicit contract laws, and explicit corporate and securities law, 
play a far smaller role than in the Western world than they do in Japan.416  Informal 
insolvency procedures are often preferred to formal systems because the formal rules 
often conflict with the value systems of the society.417  Thus, simply changing the laws 
will not necessarily change financial and legal practices, or attitudes toward financial 
failure.
2. Lesson from Hong Kong and China
Neither Hong Kong nor China has developed bankruptcy systems as elaborate as 
the Japanese bankruptcy laws.418  Hong Kong has a modern individual bankruptcy law, 
but does not have a business reorganization system.419  China has no personal bankruptcy 
system but is developing a rescue system for ailing businesses.420  As is the case in Japan, 
cultural issues may keep the Chinese from using these new laws.421
1. Hong Kong Bankruptcy Law and Culture
As one would expect from an English colony, Hong Kong’s Insolvency Laws 
have always looked somewhat similar to those of the United Kingdom.422 What is harder 
to anticipate is that Hong Kong still has no corporate reorganization process, and has 
taken few steps to modernize its business bankruptcy laws. Hong Kong’s current 
insolvency laws are based loosely on law from the United Kingdom that dates back to 
1929.423  Not surprisingly, these laws are archaic, harsh and pro-creditor.424
415 See id.
416
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417 See WSG, supra note 268, at  305. For example in Indonesia and Thailand, new restructuring laws and 
procedures were implemented after the Asian crisis. See id. at 306. These new changes have had virtually 
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is no way for a creditor to effectively foreclose on assets and no threat of take-over.
418 See infra notes 422-506 and accompanying text.  Thus, there is much less to say about the bankruptcy 
laws of Hong Kong and Japan. See also Roman Tomasic, Peter Little, Angus Francis, Kam Kamarul, and 
Kui Hua Wang, Insolvency Law Administration and Culture in Six Asian Legal Systems, 6 AUSTRALIAN J. 
CORP. L. 248, 248 (1996) (noting that the laws in place are old and their purpose is to kill the company, nor 
revive it).
419
 Leslie Burton, An Overview of Insolvency Proceedings in Asia, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 113, 
114 (2000).
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Proposed changes to the Hong Kong Insolvency laws, dealing with corporate or 
business reorganization, have failed to pass.425  Liquidation, which is referred to as 
“insolvency,” is the only option for corporations.426 For almost a decade, scholars and 
legislators have been attempting to pass corporate rescue regime in Hong Kong, to no 
avail.427 The scheme, named “provisional supervision,” was originally drafted to operate 
much like an English “Administration.” Under a provisional supervision, a specialist or 
trustee runs the company and proposes a voluntary arrangement, which creditors vote 
upon within six months.428  As in an English Administration, creditors control the 
proceeding.429  None of the drafts of the yet-to-be-passed provision supervision 
contemplate a debtor-in-possession system.430
The first drafts of the new procedure were vehemently opposed by labor groups, 
who currently receive the first dollars out of a liquidating company under the liquidation 
procedure set out in section 166 of the Companies Ordinance.431  These groups feared 
that the new provision supervision would be less favorable to their interest and thus 
opposed the bill.432  Thereafter, in order to appease these interests, the draft law was 
changed to require any company in provisional supervision to pay off in full, in advance, 
all wage claims and severance payments for all workers laid off in the past, or to be laid 
off in the future, in the context of the reorganization.433  Many scholars and legislators 
see this requirement, which is still contained in the current proposed draft bill, as a major 
obstacle to successful rehabilitation, or even attempted rehabilitation.434
Another sticking point in the current legislation has been the treatment of secured 
creditors.  In earlier drafts, secured creditors voted with all other creditors on the 
arrangement and thus could be forced to accept a plan they did not like, and could lose 
425 Id.; Philip Smart and Charles D. Booth, Corporate Rescue:  Hong Kong Developments, 10 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 41, 42 (2002).
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427 Id.
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companies.  See Charles D. Booth, Hong Kong Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments, 15 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 3 (Nov. 2000). 
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431
 The Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001, available at http://law.hku.hk/staff/psm, cited in Smart 
and Booth, supra note 425, at 45 n. 1.
432 Id.
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 The law actually requires such companies to “pay off in full (or set up a trust account with a licensed 
bank containing sufficient funds to pay off in full): (a) all wage claims owed to its employees; and (b) all 
entitlements arising under the Employee Ordinance (e.g. severance payments) owed to its former 
employees.  Smart and Booth, supra note 425, at 43.  Because the words “former employees” are 
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434 Id.  A compromise that would cap the amount of money that a firm would have to pre-pay is under 
consideration, but has not been passed.  Given labor’s strong views, passing the law with such a cap could 
prove difficult.  Moreover, passing it without such a cap could make the law ineffective or leave it unused 
despite passage.  Id.
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the benefit of their superior position in their collateral. 435 While the current draft no 
longer contains these disadvantageous provisions, the pendulum may now have shifted 
too far in the secured creditor’s favor.436  Secured creditors holding a security interest in 
all or substantially all of a debtor’s assets now have veto power over the provisional 
supervision and can, for 4-7 working days following a petition, terminate the provisional 
supervision completely.437  None of this has become law, however, so all provisions are
still up for grabs. Moreover, Hong Kong has a long history of handling insolvency and 
financial distress through informal means, such as out-of-court workouts, and this trend is 
likely to continue whether the provisional supervision passes or not.
While business bankruptcy law in Hong Kong has not been modernized, the 
bankruptcy process for individual debtors, which is called “bankruptcy,” has been relaxed 
and modernized.438 In the past, due to the discretionary discharge provisions, many 
debtors received no discharge and the quickest one could obtain a discharge was eight 
years.439  For example, for the ten-year period from 1983 through 1992, 2,400 people 
field for personal bankruptcy in Hong Kong and only 25 received a bankruptcy 
discharge.440  In effect, the discretionary discharge made bankruptcy a life sentence for 
most.441  During the post-filing period and before a discharge, a debtor cannot obtain 
additional credit.  Effective April 1, 1998, many if not most individual debtors can obtain 
a discharge within four years.442
Unlike some parts of East Asia, Hong Kong citizens have not been afraid to 
exercise their bankruptcy rights.443  In November of 2003, there were 939 bankruptcies in 
the City of Hong Kong.444  There were 1,417 during October of the same year.445  These 
numbers show that filings were down from the prior year, when there were 2,441 in 
November of 2002, and 3,193 in January of 2003.446  These numbers are astronomical 
compared to the ten years prior to this time, showing an increase in filings of over 
1,000%.447  While some of this increase can be attributed to liberalization of the 
individual bankruptcy discharge, increases in consumer credit, particularly credit cards, 
435 Id. at 44.
436 Id.
437
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may also explain these increases.448  As of September of 2002, there were nearly 7 
million residents of Hong Kong, and 9.38 million credit cards in circulation.449
Culture appears to play a much smaller role in Hong Kong’s attitudes towards 
bankruptcy, especially compared to China.450  Because Hong Kong laws are based on 
English law, the law lacks local culture elements unique to Hong Kong.451 Although there 
are remnants of Chinese ideals in Hong Kong, such as the desire to pay creditors out of 
moral obligation, these Chinese traditions are diminishing due to the transient nature of 
Hong Kong’s population. 452 Moreover, most bankruptcies in Hong Kong involve foreign 
companies rather than purely Chinese ones.  Assets in Hong Kong tend to be people 
rather than large capital assets, and money goes in and out of Hong Kong quickly, 
requiring quick court action in bankruptcy cases.  453
Not surprisingly, then, filing for bankruptcy in Hong Kong does not carry as 
much stigma as in many other Asian countries, in part because Hong Kong’s community 
is internationally- oriented and transient.454  Some large bankruptcies in the 1980’s made 
the idea more common, and therefore more acceptable.455  Among the traditional Chinese 
people who live in Hong Kong, the stigma is still present, and bankruptcies from Chinese 
owned business are rare. 456
Like the mainland Chinese, Hong Kong citizens would rather avoid courts, 
preferring to work things out on their own.457  The robust Hong Kong economy also has 
made bankruptcy reform less of a necessity.458  When businesses do fail, the banks have 
been willing to bail many out. Many people believe, however, that reform is badly 
needed in Hong Kong.459   Moreover, Hong Kong citizens are more likely to embrace and 
use modern bankruptcy laws than the citizens of either China or Japan.  Confucianism 
448 Hong Kong Bankruptcies and Jobless Rates Hit Record, THE ASIAN BANKER, Sept. 20, 2002.
449
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and other traditional forces play a smaller role in modern, long-colonized, market-based 
Hong Kong.460
3. Chinese Economics, Bankruptcy Law and Culture
Unlike colonized Hong Kong, mainland China has a long history of economic and 
social isolation, and a history reaching as far back as 221 B.C., the year it gained its 
independence. 461  China is also one of the world’s largest countries by land mass, and is 
the world’s most populated country with a population of 1,286,975,468.462 In recent 
years, China has undergone a surprising shift from a state controlled economy, to an 
economy where a growing percentage of enterprises are privately controlled.463  In fact, 
well over half of all China’s businesses are now privately owned. 464
In the past, the communist government of China has fought to limit any capitalist 
influence in the economy.465 Now due to a growing realization that capitalism may more 
efficiently produce in many sectors than many of the regime’s State Owned Enterprises 
(“SOEs”), the Communist Party of China is accepting and even encouraging 
capitalism.466
This acceptance of private enterprise did not occur suddenly. Through the 
assumption of power of the Communist Party until the 1980’s, the authorities actively 
crushed capitalist enclaves.467 In 1982 the government “rehabilitated” capitalist 
entrepreneurs in an effort to increase economic activity.”468 At the 16th party congress, 
not only were the “red capitalists” invited to join the Communist Party, some private 
entrepreneurs were even made delegates.469 The party also vowed to “promote the 
healthy development of the non-public sector” and “better safeguard private property.”470
460 Id. at 282.
461 The World Fact Book Website – China, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html, 
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China’s SOEs are concentrated in heavy industrial operations and have incurred 
large debt loads. These industries have been restructured with massive layoffs and 
corporate restructuring in an attempt to increase efficiency.471 Restructuring efforts are 
yielding limited results. Even with the Chinese government’s doubtful official statistics, 
the SOEs losses exceeded profits for the first time in 1996.472 Moreover, China’s state 
banks have written off US$15.3 billion in non-performing loans to SOEs.473
Private enterprise is developing rapidly despite a difficult regulatory environment 
and continuing government discrimination.474 By 2002, the private sector generated 
around 60% of China’s output while using only 20% of the country’s resources. The 
SOEs produced only 40% of output while consuming 80% of resources.475 The private 
sector is producing eight out of ten new jobs.476 China’s overall economy is growing by 
8% and this rate is expected to continue into 2005.477 The Chinese Communist Party is 
committed to maintaining this growth over the next two decades and the private sector 
will have to play an integral part in this growth.478
Culture plays a substantial role in Chinese laws, especially its bankruptcy laws. 479
Considering its population, China has a low level of reported commercial bankruptcies.480
In Chinese society the notion of bankruptcy has long been condemned as “bad luck” 
471
 Christopher McNally, China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Thriving or Crumbling?,  59 ASIA PACIFIC 
ISSUES 1 (2002).
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meaning “broken fortune.”481  If a father owes a debt, his sons or grandsons would be 
responsible for it; bankruptcy implies a life of burden for generations to come. 482
The Chinese historically have a low regard or disbelief in judicial power.483
Creditors focus on “guanxi” (relationships) as opposed to their entitlements to 
payment.484  As is further discussed below, bankruptcy cases in China have been 
controlled by the government not by independent courts, causing citizens to distrust of 
the system.485 Confucianism also continues to have great influence on commercial 
activities.486  Confucian ethical teachings include the following values which are held in 
high respect by the average Chinese person and are visible in Chinese business practices, 
and their use of law:  “Li,” includes ritual, propriety, etiquette; “Hsiao,” love within the 
family, love of parents for their children and of children for their parents; “Yi,” 
righteousness; “Xin,” honesty and trustworthiness, “Jen,” benevolence, humaneness 
towards others, the highest Confucian virtue; and “Chung,” loyalty to the state.487
Confucianism encourages balance and harmony.488 Unless there is no other choice, 
people should keep their friendships and relationships intact, rather than pursuing court 
intervention.  Under Confucianism it is also “anti-moral” to force a debtor into 
involuntary bankruptcy.489
Socialism and communism also have a great affect on attitudes and culture in 
China, and the resulting bankruptcy laws.490  The most developed and most significant 
Chinese Bankruptcy laws focuses on state owned enterprises (“SOE”).491  It is very 
difficult to place a SOE into bankruptcy and government permission is needed.492  SOE’s 
are property of the state and bankruptcy is viewed as a leadership failure, a loss of face, 
for the government.493  Yet, scores of SOEs operate at a loss.494  Naturally, if a large 
pressure on government leaders, second, strong opposition to bankruptcy from banks, and third, an 
entrenched “reliance” psychology in society. Id.
481
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485 Id. Chinese government policy is very conservative and will not allow significant SOEs to go bankrupt 
and judges can’t make bankruptcy decisions without government approval. Id. In addition, many 
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number of SOEs were to be closed down at one time, many people could simultaneously 
lose their jobs, and no national provision has yet been enacted to address this problem.495
If  SOEs are given free access to bankruptcy, a domino effect is also feared because many 
SOEs are deeply indebted to one another.496
Private enterprises are permitted to file a liquidation case, which can later become 
a reorganization case, under Chapters 16 and 19 of China’s Civil Procedure Law.497  If 
the case is accepted by the court, then a stay of collection efforts goes into effect.498
While all case begin as liquidations, the case can proceed, through the actions of a 
Creditors Assembly, the creditors can vote on a reorganization plan, that will be approved 
if it is approved by two- thirds of all unsecured creditors.499  Priority treatment is given to 
wage claims first, and then to taxes.500
In 1986, China passed a controversial law that permitted the bankruptcy of 
SOEs.501 These cases all start as liquidations but can then become reorganization cases.502
The goal in enacting this new law was to encourage more efficient management of SOEs 
and to liquidate unprofitable businesses.503 Lawmakers continue to call for reform of this 
law, however, because it leaves the decision about whether a company can file for 
bankruptcy in the hands of the government rather than courts or creditors.504  Courts are 
still not independent, and the community continues to have a lack of trust for judicial 
bodies.505  Moreover, despite the clear purpose of the new law, the government still views 
it as a loss of face if an SOE fails, and thus limits access to the new system.506  Clearly, 
the desire to compete in a global capital market cannot overcome ancient cultural and 
societal beliefs.
3.  Conclusions About East Asian Bankruptcy Policies and Culture
As many traditional societies are learning, changing the law and getting people to 
use the new law, are two very different things.  Japan, for example, pushed for early 
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passage of its new Civil Rehabilitation Law, one of the few debtor-in--possession 
systems on the world.  It was enacted ahead of schedule, to try to help breathe life into 
Japan’s floundering economy. While it has been used to some extent, the government 
would like to see it used much more.507    Shame over debt is still prevalent.  With more 
debt in the system, a recessionary economy and more business failures, debt-related 
suicides have been on the rise. 508  While Japan’s Economy Minister has called for a 
change in both laws and attitudes about debt repayment, it is far easier to change the laws 
than the attitudes. 
As China prepares to approve and unfold its reorganization scheme, it may be 
faced with similar problems.  The Chinese also consider it a shameful thing to not pay 
ones debts, a misfortune that would follow one for the rest of his or her life.509 Culturally, 
like the Japanese, the Chinese are taught to value relationships over money and self-
promotion.510
None of the Asian countries discussed have high corporate bankruptcy rates.  The 
reasons are both cultural and opportunity-driven.  Sometimes the law is not helpful.  
Much of the time, cultural factors make bankruptcy taboo. In China, businesses can 
continue to hide behind state ownership even if they are not profitable. No one loses face.  
Where this is unavailable, such as in Japan’s capitalist market, then suicide is one way 
out; for some it is preferable to using the new laws.  Japan and other countries with a 
strong culture of shame must find a way to balance economic goals, such as fueling the 
economy through more and more credit, with the serious ramifications of over-
indebtedness.  In the end, bankruptcy systems must be drafted to meet a country’s 
cultural as well as economic needs.  Merely transplanting bankruptcy systems from other 
parts of the world, particularly culturally dissimilar places, is ineffective.  The resulting 
laws are misunderstood, distrusted and underutilized.
507
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VI.  CONCLUSION
As the above discussion of U.S. policy demonstrates, the “fresh start,” as well as 
the reorganization through a debtor-in-possession, grew from the ground up from the 
roots of American capitalism.511  First came the creation of an entrepreneurial 
economy,512 followed by an active consumer economy. The conditions for such a system 
were present from the beginning of the economy and the bankruptcy systems grew 
directly from them.
Today other countries are attempting to create more vibrant market-based 
economies, in part by developing new insolvency systems.513 At the same time, citizens 
of the world are also being exposed to more and more credit, often more than they can 
back.514 One fairly obvious way to reduce the pain and suffering that could result from 
this new credit economy is to enact lenient discharge and reorganization laws to address 
the financial failure that will inevitably occur.  This is certainly the global trend.515
This Article suggests that creating more forgiving insolvency systems may make 
economic and social sense but still may not be accepted in some societies.  On the other 
hand, attitudes toward bankruptcy in the U.S. changed once bankruptcy became more 
common, so perhaps long-held cultural views around the world will change as well.  Only 
time will tell.  In the meantime, governments and lawmakers must realize that imported 
bankruptcy systems are not being implanted onto blank cultural slates, such as the U.S. 
economy and social system of the 1700’s and early 1800’s. Many existing cultures are far 
more complicated. To those governments, I suggest the following cautious approach to 
developing new insolvency systems.
First, recognizing that new bankruptcy systems take some time to be accepted, 
governments and lawmakers should think very carefully and cautiously about how and 
when to deregulate credit systems.  They should try to limit available credit to that which 
citizens can handle on their incomes, and try not to assume that extensive credit and 
purchasing power necessarily represents the good life.  For a society that does not accept 
debt forgiveness, even if it is legally permissible, this could be a dangerous trap.  The 
social consequences could include losing the family home, other possessions, and even 
family members themselves.
Second, assuming that it may be too late to carefully consider how credit is 
regulated, because it already has been extended in amounts higher than many can pay, 
governments and lawmakers should try to educate the public about responsible credit use, 
as well as the debt forgiveness benefits that the law provides.  Such education is being 
attempted in both Europe and Japan, although many consumers report that they are 
511
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unaware of the debt forgiveness now allowed by law. Others still refuse to use these laws 
because doing so is dishonorable.516  Education efforts should continue, in an effort to 
destigmatize, as well as to avoid isolation, voluntary exile and suicide from over-
indebtedness.
Finally, governments that are working on new bankruptcy systems should avoid 
the wholesale transplantation of any system, but in particular, should avoid transplanting 
U.S. systems without giving thought to the individual components of such laws. U.S. debt 
culture appears to be different from that of most of the rest of the world, and more 
moderate approaches may transplant with greater success. Transplanted aspects of U.S. 
bankruptcy law have been ignored in practice in Germany, Japan, Eastern Europe, 
Indonesia,517 and Thailand,518as well as other parts of the world.  They are simply too 
confusing, contextual, and complicated to make sense in their new homes, and also are 
based on social and cultural assumptions that the new host countries do not share.519 This 
causes more problems than it solves by suggesting that the social problems caused by 
over-indebtedness have been solved when they have not.  Rather than importing any 
systems wholesale, countries should attempt to borrow from many systems, and should 
ensure that the new law reflects both the economic needs of the society, as well as the 
unique cultural components of the society.520
516 See Doing Business in Japan, supra note 375, at §7.02.
517 See WSG, supra note 262, at 306.
518 See id.
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